

立法會
Legislative Council

LC Paper No. FC189/17-18
(These minutes have been
seen by the Administration)

Ref : FC/1/1(24)

Finance Committee of the Legislative Council

Minutes of the 48th meeting
held at Conference Room 1 of the Legislative Council Complex
on Friday, 16 June 2017, at 3:15 pm

Members present:

Hon CHAN Kin-por, BBS, JP (Chairman)
Hon Michael TIEN Puk-sun, BBS, JP (Deputy Chairman)
Hon James TO Kun-sun
Hon Abraham SHEK Lai-him, GBS, JP
Hon Tommy CHEUNG Yu-yan, GBS, JP
Prof Hon Joseph LEE Kok-long, SBS, JP
Hon Jeffrey LAM Kin-fung, GBS, JP
Hon Starry LEE Wai-king, SBS, JP
Hon CHAN Hak-kan, BBS, JP
Dr Hon Priscilla LEUNG Mei-fun, SBS, JP
Hon Mrs Regina IP LAU Suk-yee, GBS, JP
Hon Paul TSE Wai-chun, JP
Hon LEUNG Kwok-hung
Hon Claudia MO
Hon Steven HO Chun-yin, BBS
Hon Frankie YICK Chi-ming, JP
Hon WU Chi-wai, MH
Hon YIU Si-wing, BBS
Hon MA Fung-kwok, SBS, JP
Hon Charles Peter MOK, JP
Hon CHAN Chi-chuen
Hon CHAN Han-pan, JP
Hon Kenneth LEUNG
Dr Hon KWOK Ka-ki

Hon Dennis KWOK Wing-hang
Hon Christopher CHEUNG Wah-fung, SBS, JP
Dr Hon Fernando CHEUNG Chiu-hung
Dr Hon Helena WONG Pik-wan
Hon IP Kin-yuen
Hon Martin LIAO Cheung-kong, SBS, JP
Hon POON Siu-ping, BBS, MH
Ir Dr Hon LO Wai-kwok, SBS, MH, JP
Hon CHUNG Kwok-pan
Hon Andrew WAN Siu-kin
Hon CHU Hoi-dick
Hon Jimmy NG Wing-ka, JP
Dr Hon Junius HO Kwan-yiu, JP
Hon LAM Cheuk-ting
Hon Holden CHOW Ho-ding
Hon SHIU Ka-fai
Dr Hon Pierre CHAN
Hon CHAN Chun-ying
Hon CHEUNG Kwok-kwan, JP
Hon HUI Chi-fung
Hon LUK Chung-hung
Hon LAU Kwok-fan, MH
Hon KWONG Chun-yu
Hon Jeremy TAM Man-ho
Hon Nathan LAW Kwun-chung
Dr Hon YIU Chung-yim
Dr Hon LAU Siu-lai

Members absent:

Hon LEUNG Yiu-chung
Hon WONG Ting-kwong, SBS, JP
Hon WONG Kwok-kin, SBS, JP
Hon LEUNG Che-cheung, BBS, MH, JP
Hon Alice MAK Mei-kuen, BBS, JP
Hon KWOK Wai-keung
Dr Hon Elizabeth QUAT, JP
Dr Hon CHIANG Lai-wan, JP
Hon Alvin YEUNG
Hon HO Kai-ming
Hon SHIU Ka-chun

Hon Wilson OR Chong-shing, MH
Hon YUNG Hoi-yan
Hon Tanya CHAN
Hon Kenneth LAU Ip-keung, MH, JP
Dr Hon CHENG Chung-tai

[According to the Judgment of the Court of First Instance of the High Court on 14 July 2017, LEUNG Kwok-hung, Nathan LAW Kwun-chung, YIU Chung-yim and LAU Siu-lai have been disqualified from assuming the office of a member of the Legislative Council, and have vacated the same since 12 October 2016, and are not entitled to act as a member of the Legislative Council.]

Public officers attending:

Ms Elizabeth TSE Man-ye, JP	Permanent Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury (Treasury)
Ms Carol YUEN, JP	Deputy Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury (Treasury) 1
Mr Alfred ZHI Jian-hong	Principal Executive Officer (General), Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau (The Treasury Branch)
Mr YAU Shing-mu, JP	Under Secretary for Transport and Housing
Ms Rebecca PUN Ting-ting, JP	Deputy Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport) 1
Mr Raymond CHENG Nim-tai	Principal Assistant Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport) 7
Mr Daniel CHUNG Kum-wah, JP	Director of Highways
Mr Jimmy CHAN Pai-ming, JP	Principal Government Engineer (Railway Development), Highways Department
Mr Frankie CHOU Wing-ping	Chief Engineer (Railway Development)1-2, Highways Department
Dr Philco WONG	Projects Director, MTR Corporation Limited
Mr Ken WONG	General Manager (Projects), MTR Corporation Limited
Mr Jason WONG	General Manager (SCL Civil (EWL)), MTR Corporation Limited
Mr Stephen YAU	Manager (Estimates, Cost Control and Logistics), MTR Corporation Limited

Ms Prudence CHAN
Senior Manager (Projects and Property Communications), MTR Corporation Limited

Clerk in attendance:

Ms Anita SIT
Assistant Secretary General 1

Staff in attendance:

Ms Ada LAU
Mr Raymond SZETO
Miss Queenie LAM
Mr Frankie WOO
Ms Michelle NIEN
Senior Council Secretary (1)7
Council Secretary (1)5
Senior Legislative Assistant (1)2
Senior Legislative Assistant (1)3
Legislative Assistant (1)5

Action

The Chairman reminded members of the requirements under Rule 83A and Rule 84 of the Rules of Procedure.

2. Members sought to raise points of order on the agenda of the meeting. Ms Claudia MO expressed disagreement with the Chairman's decision to allow the Administration to rearrange the agenda items for meetings of the Finance Committee ("FC"), such that the item on the Kai Tak Sports Park ("KTSP") would be inserted to the agenda and would be discussed after Item No. 1. Dr YIU Chung-yim pointed out that Hong Kong's tender price index was showing signs of a downward trend. Thus, the situation was unlike the Administration's claim that the costs of the KTSP project would increase if the construction works were delayed. Dr YIU considered that the Administration should provide further information to justify its request for rearranging the agenda items. Expressing similar views, Mr CHU Hoi-dick held that the Administration should not seek to insert the item on KTSP to the agenda.

3. The Chairman explained to members the justifications provided by the Administration for its request to rearrange the agenda items as follows:

- (a) the closing date of the project tender was 21 July 2017;

- (b) if funding provision was not approved, the KTSP project would be delayed by at least six to nine months, while the increase in the project costs would be in the region of \$800 million to \$1,200 million; and
- (c) the three items originally placed after Item No. 1 could be rearranged without entailing serious consequences.

Item No. 1 — FCR(2017-18)10

**RECOMMENDATION OF THE PUBLIC WORKS
SUBCOMMITTEE MADE ON 5 APRIL 2017**

PWSC(2016-17)43

Head 706 — HIGHWAYS

Transport — Railways

**63TR — Shatin to Central Link—construction of railway
works—advance works**

4. FC continued with the deliberation on item FCR(2017-18)10. The Chairman advised that the item sought FC's approval for the recommendation of the Public Works Subcommittee ("PWSC") made at its meeting held on 5 April 2017, i.e. the recommendation set out in PWSC(2016-17)43 to increase the approved project estimate ("APE") of 63TR (Shatin to Central Link ("SCL")—construction of railway works—advance works) by \$847.7 million from \$6,254.9 million to \$7,102.6 million in money-of-the-day ("MOD") prices. Some members had requested that the funding proposal be voted on separately at the FC meeting. FC commenced deliberation on the item at its meeting on 9 June 2017 and had spent a total of about four hours on the discussion of the funding proposal. The Administration provided supplementary information on the item this morning.

5. The Chairman declared that he was an independent non-executive director of The Bank of East Asia.

Monitoring mechanism of the Government and its effectiveness

6. Dr KWOK Ka-ki asked whether the cost overruns of \$847.7 million for the SCL project were a result of claims filed by the contractors.

7. In response, the Director of Highways ("D of Hy") pointed out that:
 - (a) the contractors were entitled to file claims in respect of circumstances which were unforeseeable or outside the scope of the contract;
 - (b) there were elements of claims in the cost overruns; and
 - (c) the MTR Corporation Limited ("MTRCL") was responsible for considering whether the claims were sufficiently justified.

8. Mr Jeremy TAM questioned that while the Administration stated in page 9 of its paper (LC Paper No. FC182/16-17(01))(Chinese version only) that Jacobs China Limited ("Jacobs") did not take up any work in relation to the Government's monitoring on the SCL project, it advised in paragraph 3 of Annex IV to the same document that during the period between 2008 to 2010, MTRCL had engaged Jacobs to assist in the preliminary design of the SCL project during its advance stage. Mr TAM requested the Administration to clarify the discrepancy of information contained in the paper.

9. In reply, the Under Secretary for Transport and Housing ("USTH") advised that:
 - (a) Jacobs did not take up any work in relation to the Government's monitoring on the SCL project; and
 - (b) the work mentioned in Annex IV was limited to that MTRCL outsourced to Jacobs in relation to SCL, and it had nothing to do with the monitoring of the project.

10. The General Manager (Projects), MTRCL replied that:
 - (a) Jacobs' participation in the advance work of the SCL project involved two aspects;
 - (b) during the period between 2013 and 2015, MTRCL had engaged six geotechnical personnel from Jacobs on a short-term contract basis to assist in the work of the Geotechnical Section of the South Island Line (East) construction project (including working at the sites in the tunnels of Admiralty). Those six technical personnel were deployed to work inside the sites inside the tunnels and record

the post-blast rock and geological conditions of the tunnels after each blast. Their day-to-day work was directly assigned and supervised by MTRCL engineering staff;

- (c) separately, during the period between 2008 and 2010 when the preliminary design of SCL was being prepared at the advance stage, MTRCL had engaged Jacobs to assist in the inspection of the contractor who had been awarded the contract for site investigation works under the investigation programme prepared by MTRCL, as well as the management of the daily operation on the site, so as to ensure the delivery of works by the contractor in accordance with contractual requirements. Work in relation to the site at Admiralty Station commenced in mid-2009 and only lasted about six months; and
- (d) for the items of works involved in the present application to the Legislative Council ("LegCo") for additional funding, all ground investigation records that had been prepared were finally checked by authorized professionals/registered geotechnical engineers ("RGEs") who were internal staff of MTRCL. Information contained in the ground investigation records, including the spacing between the natural joints of the rocks and the depth of bedrock surface at the drill holes could be verified against objective evidence such as the retained core samples and the actual conditions of rock strata as seen in the field.

Unfavourable ground conditions

11. Dr Helena WONG asked whether the ground investigation works and collection of rock specimens were carried out by the Administration or MTRCL. After the MTRCL's representative had provided an initial reply, Dr WONG further questioned why the Administration should bear the cost overruns arising from inaccurate data, given that the ground investigation works were not carried out by the Administration. Dr WONG enquired about the apportionment of responsibilities between MTRCL and the contractor in respect of the geological data as set out in the contract. Dr WONG also asked whether cost overruns arising from unfavourable ground conditions would invariably be borne by the Administration; and whether the construction cost would be lowered accordingly if the geological condition turned out to be better than expected.

12. The Projects Director, MTRCL ("PD/MTRCL") replied that:
- (a) MTRCL would conduct ground investigations before each project;
 - (b) according to the requirements of the Buildings Department, the ground investigation work must be undertaken by RGEs;
 - (c) the engineer responsible for ground investigation under the present project was an RGE of MTRCL;
 - (d) MTRCL's geotechnical engineer would commission a registered contractor to undertake the ground investigation works which must be carried out by professional geotechnical engineers;
 - (e) if both parties could duly complete the works in accordance with the relevant requirements without committing any mistakes, they would have fulfilled their contractual obligations;
 - (f) it was difficult to predict and avoid discrepancies between actual conditions and investigation data. The ground investigation report might not accurately reflect the actual geological condition which would only become clear after excavation works had begun. As such, the tenderers would use the ground investigation report as a reference;
 - (g) the condition of the rock and soil layers could vary substantially. Likewise, the findings could vary substantially if there was a distance of 15 to 30 metres between the investigation points;
 - (h) in normal construction works contracts, the responsibility of geological variations would be borne by the Employer; and
 - (i) if the contractor was to be held responsible for geological variations, the tender price would be increased substantially.

13. Dr KWOK Ka-ki asked whether the contractor had been able to file claims against the Government because the discrepancies in Geoguide 2 published by the Government had led to the mistakes made by MTRCL and its contractor. Mr KWONG Chun-yu considered that there was an urgent need to update the Geoguide, so as to minimize the possibility of cost overruns resulting from such mistakes. Mr KWONG also remarked that the repeated occurrence of cost overruns was unacceptable.

14. In response, D of Hy stated that:

- (a) the Geoguide, which set out the basic requirements, was only meant to be a reference;
- (b) decisions for each project were made professionally by professionals on the basis of the investigation findings;
- (c) the claims would only involve circumstances not covered by the contract; and
- (d) the Government could not possibly transfer all risks to the contractor.

15. USTH replied that:

- (a) works projects undertaken over the past 10 years had already been set out in LC Paper No. FC182/16-17(01), and only about 10% of them had incurred cost overruns;
- (b) while the Geoguide had been updated previously, the Development Bureau as well as the Civil Engineering and Development Department would consider members' views on updating it further; and
- (c) regarding the costs of public works projects as a whole, the Administration had already advised vide the supplementary information provided to PWSC on 9 May 2017 that although in recent years, there had been instances where certain mega projects had experienced delays or required additional funding, it was evident from the information provided by the Development Bureau that the Administration had maintained consistently good performance in cost estimation and management for projects under the Capital Works Programme as a whole. According to the information from the

Development Bureau, FC approved a total of about 650 Category A projects with total funding amounting to about \$770 billion over the past 10 years. Amongst these approved projects, around 70 required applications to FC for additional provisions which amounted to about \$60 billion in total. In other words, increases to APE were required in about 10% of the approved projects and the additional provisions amounted to about 8% of the total funding approved. Separately, according to the information provided by the Development Bureau, although there were projects that required additional funding owing to some individual circumstances, the Government generally managed to complete the projects under the Capital Works Programme within the original APE overall and even with surplus. For example, about 850 Category A projects had the final accounts settled in the past 10 years. Their original approved estimates totaled about \$240 billion as compared with the total final expenditure of about \$210 billion. Though some projects needed to apply for additional provisions from FC, the cost overruns were well offset by surpluses from other projects. The balance amounted to about \$30 billion. In short, the total surpluses from these projects at final settlement accounted for about 15% of their original APE.

16. In response, PD/MTRCL said that:
- (a) there was room for improvement in respect of ground investigation works, such as narrowing the spacing and increasing the depth of investigation drill holes; and
 - (b) furthermore, the number of investigation drill holes could be suitably increased as per the advice of the professionals.

Financial arrangement

17. Dr YIU Chung-yim pointed out that according to the information set out in Tables 1 and 2 of Annex III to LC Paper No. FC182/16-17(01), the amounts of approved funding provision and approved additional funding provision of certain projects (including 6718TH and 6582TH) were exactly the same. Dr YIU questioned whether the relevant information was reliable. He also suggested that the Administration only singled out the data between the 2006 and 2016 legislative sessions for the sake of deliberately deflating the amounts of cost overruns and additional funding

Action

Admin

provisions. Mr Nathan LAW and Ir Dr LO Wai-kwok requested the Administration to provide, for each of the items set out in Tables 1 and 2 of Annex III to the supplementary paper provided by the Administration for the present item (LC Paper No. FC182/16-17(01)), the amount of total funding provisions approved by FC, the original amount of funding provision sought and the amount of additional funding provision (if any).

18. USTH and the Principal Assistant Secretary for Transport and Housing (Transport) 7 ("PAS(T)7") pointed out that:

- (a) all the relevant information was provided by the Development Bureau and not fabricated;
- (b) the Administration would follow up on the accuracy of the said figures;
- (c) the paper had already set out clearly that for the present item, the Administration sought to increase the project costs from the original estimate of over \$6,250 million to about \$7,100 million; and
- (d) information contained in the paper was related to the Government's past performance in the implementation of public works projects overall.

19. Ms Claudia MO remarked that the Administration's present application for additional funding provision was only "a financial management technique" to cover up its dereliction of duty in project supervision. Ms MO also questioned whether cost overruns had become commonplace in the implementation of various major works projects.

20. USTH stated that:

- (a) application for additional funding provisions was absolutely not "a financial management technique";
- (b) various cost items had already been clearly set out in the paper; and
- (c) standalone data might not necessarily reflect the actual situation.

21. In response, the Permanent Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury (Treasury) ("PS(Tsy)) pointed out that:

- (a) in Table 1 of the paper, works projects with approved funding provisions over the past 10 years were set out, together with the amount of funding provisions actually approved by FC; and
- (b) in Table 2, works projects which required additional funding provisions were set out, together with the amount of funding provisions actually approved by FC.

22. Ir Dr LO Wai-kwok opined that while cost overruns might occur if the budget was on the tight side, wastes might be created with a slack budget. He also pointed out that project costs could increase if the numbers of investigation drill holes and rock samples were excessive. The authorities should therefore strike a balance when considering the number of investigation drill holes and rock samples required.

23. Mr CHU Hoi-dick questioned that the way the provision for price adjustments was presented in the paper could not reflect the actual payments (including cost overruns) required under different contract modes for the project. Mr CHU requested the Administration to provide a breakdown of the cost overruns incurred by various works contracts under the SCL project. Mr CHU also asked whether the contract mode for a project would affect the cost estimation prepared by the Administration.

Admin

24. In reply, the Principal Government Engineer (Railway Development), Highways Department ("PGE/RD") advised that:

- (a) when estimating the costs of a project, the Administration had made reference to the relevant costs of similar projects in the past;
- (b) as the project would take years to complete, the price would vary over time;
- (c) the provision for price adjustments was meant to be a sum of money reserved to cope with estimated price changes in the coming years;
- (d) construction costs would increase as the project proceeded to a certain stage and ran into unforeseen circumstances;

- (e) apart from the price increase per se, extended project schedule would also lead to escalating costs;
- (f) when seeking FC's approval for funding provisions, the costs were calculated in MOD prices;
- (g) the paper had already set out clearly the original project estimates at the time when funding approval was sought, as well as the latest projected figures for the actual payable price. The two sets of figures were listed out separately to facilitate members' understanding;
- (h) Enclosure 5 to PWSC(2016-17)43 already provided the breakdown requested by Mr CHU, as well as a comparison with the approved estimates;
- (i) the Administration advised that it would provide the relevant information as far as possible after the meeting;
- (j) the contract modes for projects did not have direct relationship with the project estimates; and
- (k) for fixed-price contracts, the contractor would include in the tender price its projections on future price changes.

25. Mr James TO asked whether prices would only be adjusted upwards and not downwards during the contract period, as well as how the Administration could ensure the accuracy of the provision for price adjustment. Mr TO also requested a breakdown of the first 10 items (by amount) on provision for price adjustment.

26. PGE/RD pointed out that:

- (a) price adjustments could be positive or negative. There had been cases where there were negative price adjustments when the prices had gone down;
- (b) for ease of comparison, it was necessary to convert the latest projected MOD prices into 2010 prices, i.e. the time when the Administration sought funding approval from FC; and

- (c) in the submission for additional funding provisions, the Administration had converted the actual and projected future cash flows (i.e. \$7,102.6 million in MOD prices) into constant prices (i.e. \$5,807.1 million in September 2010 prices) on the basis of the latest set of assumptions on the trend rate of change in the prices of public sector building and construction output, so that the original and latest estimates of various cost items could be compared on an equal footing.

27. PS(Tsy) pointed out that:

- (a) factors leading to additional provision for price adjustment due to extended project schedule, as well as the impact of cash flow changes on costs, were set out in Enclosure 4; and
- (b) a breakdown of various cost items was provided in Enclosure 5.

Handling of claims and compensation

28. Mr James TO and Mr CHU Hoi-dick doubted whether MTRCL had endeavoured to minimize the amount of cost overruns to be borne by the Government, including how MTRCL had handled claims filed by the contractors that involved larger sums or were of a more important nature. Mr TO sought information about the disputed cases. Mr Nathan LAW enquired about the claims filed by the contractors, as well as the response of the Highways Department ("HyD").

29. D of Hy replied that the nature of the relevant entrustment agreement was rather special as the expanded Admiralty Station would have to serve passengers on both SCL and the South Island Line (East), MTRCL therefore would need to shoulder part of the additional project costs. As such, MTRCL would spare no effort in minimizing the amount of overrun costs. D of Hy said that the Administration would strive to provide the requested information on the condition that no commercially sensitive information would be divulged.

30. Referring to clause 4.10 of the compensation clauses set out in Annex V to LC Paper No. FC182/16-17(01), Mr Dennis KWOK asked whether the compensation payable by MTRCL would be capped at the amount of fees it would receive from the Government under the entrustment agreement, and whether the said ceiling would also apply to the circumstances set out in clause 5.2.

31. PAS(T)7 responded that:

- (a) under clause 4.10, MTRCL's liability in respect of death or personal injury, or its third-party liability, was unlimited;
- (b) payment that was incurred as a result of MTRCL's mismanagement would be subject to a ceiling which was the amount of project management costs receivable by MTRCL from the Government;
- (c) the ceiling of project management costs also applied to the circumstances set out in clause 5.2; and
- (d) there was no previous case in which the amount of compensation had exceeded the ceiling of project management costs.

32. Noting that the relevant works under the project had been completed, Mr CHAN Chi-chuen enquired about the sums of project estimates for 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 as set out in Table 2 of Enclosure 4 to PWSC(2016-17)43, as well as their relationship with the present proposal for additional funding provisions.

33. PGE/RD stated that after the completion of the relevant works, MTRCL had to prepare the final accounts first and seek FC's approval for additional funding provisions before making payments to the contractors. The estimated costs set out in Table 2 for 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 represented the sums payable to the contractors in the next few years.

34. Dr KWOK Ka-ki pointed out that in paragraph 6 of LC Paper No. FC182/16-17(01), the Administration stated that according to SCL's entrustment agreement, MTRCL was responsible for the overall management of the project. MTRCL should also use its best endeavours to complete or procure the completion of the entrustment activities in accordance with the entrustment programme. In this connection, Dr KWOK enquired about the criteria adopted by the Administration to determine whether MTRCL had used its best endeavours to complete the entrustment activities or otherwise.

35. D of Hy replied that:

- (a) HyD and the monitoring and verification consultant it commissioned had closely monitored whether MTRCL had used its best endeavours to take forward the project; and
- (b) if the Government suffered losses as a result of MTRCL's negligence in performing its duties, the Government would seek to recover such losses from MTRCL.

36. Mr Nathan LAW raised the following questions:

- (a) how would the surpluses be used if the amount of provision for price adjustments exceeded the actual rates of inflation; and
- (b) whether the provision for price adjustments would be used to cover non-inflation-linked additional expenses arising from extended project schedule.

37. PD/MTRCL replied that:

- (a) contractors must uphold the spirit of contract and bear the relevant risks, regardless of whether fixed-price or fluctuating-price contracts had been adopted; and
- (b) costs would need to be adjusted if contractual changes were made as a result of extended project schedule arising from unforeseeable circumstances.

38. Mr WU Chi-wai sought the following information in respect of the different contract modes for projects:

Admin

- (a) the way in which the Administration controlled and monitored project costs; and
- (b) whether the Administration had reached prior agreement with MTRCL on the modes of project contracts to be used.

39. Mr Michael TIEN pointed out that the cost overruns incurred by certain items of works had more than doubled the original estimates, and the cost overruns of such items had accounted for a substantial portion of the total cost overruns. However, the Government and MTRCL had all along failed to take the initiative to inform members of such a major increase in costs, hence creating the impression that MTRCL was not acting professionally. Given that the information in the Geoguide compiled by the Government was seriously incomplete, Mr TIEN asked whether MTRCL would compile its own Geoguide in order to improve the accuracy of its ground investigation works.

40. PD/MTRCL said that MTRCL would draw on its ground investigation experience in previous works projects and improve its ground investigation works in future.

Meeting arrangement

41. At 4:12 pm, the Chairman urged that members inside the LegCo Complex intending to speak on the item should come to the Conference Room as soon as possible and take turn to speak. The Chairman advised that he would end the discussion on the item within a certain period of time. FC would then vote on whether motions proposed to be moved by members under paragraph 37A of the Finance Committee Procedure should be proceeded with forthwith.

42. At 4:52 pm, the Chairman advised that the discussion of FC and the Public Works Subcommittee on this item had lasted 11 hours. As the speeches made by members had become repetitive, the Chairman directed that each member might speak on the item for the last round for not more than three minutes. Members who had already pressed the button to indicate their intention to speak prior to his making the direction and were still waiting for their turn could have an extra minute of speaking time.

43. The meeting ended at 5:16 pm.