ISE10/19-20
| Subject: | information technology and broadcasting, constitutional affairs, disinformation, fake news |
- Disinformation refers to false information, including fake news, which is deliberately created and spread to cause harm to individuals or society.1Legend symbol denoting See European Commission (2019b). Whilst not a new phenomenon, disinformation has recently been the focus of growing attention in Hong Kong. Particularly, in the digital age, the effect of disinformation has been amplified by the ubiquity of the Internet and social media networks, and rising use of bots.
- In Hong Kong, disinformation has reportedly become more prevalent, especially during social incidents in the second half of 2019 and the outbreak of Coronavirus Diseases in recent months.2Legend symbol denoting See Bloomberg (2019) and South China Morning Post (2020). Legislative Council Members have raised grave concerns at various meetings over the impact of fake news.3Legend symbol denoting There was one Council Question about online disinformation being raised at the Council meeting of 6 November 2019. Members also discussed the issue at another Council meeting and a meeting of the Panel on Commerce and Industry. See GovHK (2019c), Legislative Council Secretariat (2019b) and Minutes of Meeting of the Panel on Commerce and Industry (2019). The Chief Executive of HKSAR has also called on the public to be vigilant against fake news and rumours, stressing the need to study and consider approaches to monitoring online disinformation.4Legend symbol denoting See GovHK (2019a) and 香港電台(2020年). While the Government has scaled up efforts to clarify rumours and speculations, there are suggestions that Hong Kong should look at overseas experiences in enhancing its resilience to disinformation.5Legend symbol denoting See 信報(2019年).
- Measures to tackle disinformation vary from one place to another. Some places focus on non-regulatory measures such as formulating rapid communications plan, supporting fact-checking initiatives, encouraging media self-regulation and promoting media literacy. Other places have introduced dedicated regulatory regimes to tackle the issue. This issue of Essentials first reviews relevant measures in Hong Kong and is followed by an overview of the various approaches adopted in overseas places.
Tackling online disinformation in Hong Kong
- In Hong Kong, a survey indicates that the Internet has surpassed television as the most trusted news source, with 74% of the respondents getting news from websites in 2019, nearly doubled from a decade ago.6Legend symbol denoting See Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (2019). Online platforms, however, are also seen as major channels for spreading disinformation. While there is no official data on the prevalence of disinformation in Hong Kong, a separate survey showed that some 64% in the territory reported seeing fake news on the Internet. More than half who had encountered fake news claimed to have initially believed it, at least sometimes.7Legend symbol denoting See Centre for International Governance Innovation and Ipsos (2019).
- The Basic Law protects the freedom of speech of Hong Kong residents, but such freedom is not without bounds. Despite the absence of legislation that expressly addresses online disinformation, Hong Kong has a number of provisions that may be applicable to online speech. These include criminal intimidation under the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) and blackmail under the Theft Ordinance (Cap. 210). Making inappropriate speech online may also breach other offences, such as data protection principles under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486), infringement of copyright, libel or the common law offence of inciting public nuisance if such information poses a threat to public safety.8Legend symbol denoting See GovHK (2019c).
- Notwithstanding the above, the spread of disinformation may not often be linked with or result in the above offences, but its impact could be detrimental. To counter online disinformation, the Government focuses on making clarifications and rebuttals through various channels. The Information Services Department has created a dedicated page on its news website and a series of one-minuters on social media platforms to make clarifications about government policies.9Legend symbol denoting See GovHK (2020) and Legislative Council Secretariat (2019a). The Hong Kong Police Force makes use of online and traditional channels such as press conferences to debunk speculations.10Legend symbol denoting See GovHK (2019b and 2019d). Meanwhile, the Government has run TV and radio advertisements to raise public awareness about fake news and the importance of fact-checking. Nevertheless, these measures are still considered not adequate in combating disinformation.
- In contrast to Hong Kong, some overseas places have strengthened their efforts to tackle disinformation in recent years. For instance, the United Kingdom ("UK") has established a dedicated unit within its Cabinet Office to lead the work; Finland has collaborated with external independent services on fact-checking initiatives; and the European Union ("EU") has developed a voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation for social media platforms. Singapore and France are among the places to introduce a dedicated regulatory regime against online disinformation, although this approach is often considered controversial.11Legend symbol denoting Legislation in both Singapore and France has generated intense local debates. In Hong Kong, some Legislative Council Members have expressed concerns about the controversial nature of legislation against disinformation as some fear that it might weaken freedom of speech. See Legislative Council Secretariat (2019b) and 立場新聞(2019年). Their different ways of fighting against disinformation are discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.
Overseas non-regulatory approaches to tackling disinformation
Setting up a dedicated unit to formulate rapid communications plan
- The UK is one of the places adopting a non-regulatory approach to counter disinformation. In April 2018, its government launched a Rapid Response Unit ("RRU") tasked with identifying disinformation and analysing major trends in online government-related discussion, such as Brexit. Composed of a team of specialists including data scientists and social media experts, RRU is high-level unit established within the executive branch by the Cabinet Office.12Legend symbol denoting See U.K. Parliament (2019) and U.S. Library of Congress (2019). Following its launch, RRU has developed its own model with the acronym FACT (find, assess, create and target), laying down handy principles to help train officers identify and respond to misleading online information at speed.13Legend symbol denoting The four principles are: (a) finding new sources that promote false content; (b) assessing the scale/impact of disinformation and considering approaches to response; (c) creating appropriate content to rebalance the narrative; and (d) targeting content to ensure official information is highly visible.
- In terms of strategy, RRU focuses on more than rebutting false information on government channels. It coordinates with media teams across the government, providing them with the tools and skills needed to ensure that they are able to quickly and effectively respond to the modern news environment. Recently, it has worked with social media platforms to remove harmful content about the coronavirus outbreak. RRU also shows its round-the-clock efforts to help monitor news trends and identify false content that warrants immediate government clarification by tapping into advanced technology, such as machine learning and other analytics tools. As a result of these analyses, RRU is able to deploy more effective social media strategies to improve the visibility of government information, especially during times of crisis.14Legend symbol denoting For example, in the incident relating to the 2018 chemical weapon attack in Syria, RRU shared that it had improved the ranking of UK government information from below 200 to number 1, within hours after it detected false information about the UK's position. See Government Communication Service (2018 and 2019).
Supporting fact-checking/verification initiatives
- Some countries have engaged external partners to enhance the credibility of anti-disinformation initiatives. One example is Finland's support to a non-governmental organization that runs Faktabaari, an independent fact-checking service. It rates and reviews the accuracy of trending news stories and even claims made by celebrities, and publishes its verdict online. Launched in 2014, Faktabaari raised €30,000 (HK$260,000) in seed funding from a competition organized by the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications, and received other grants awarded by the government as well as various foundations.15Legend symbol denoting See Faktabaari (Undated).
- Another example is Germany's collaborative engagements with social networks during critical periods, such as elections. In the run-up to the European elections in 2019, Germany's Federal Office of Information Security joined forces with major social media companies to crack down fake accounts and disinformation. It had sought help from major online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Google to verify social media accounts for candidates and implement measures to safeguard against hacking and other security incidents.16Legend symbol denoting See Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (2019) and CNN (2019).
Self-regulation by online platforms and media organizations
- Some European countries have promoted self-regulation by online platforms to combat disinformation. This approach has gained traction after EU introduced a voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation, whose signatories include leading online platforms, such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, and trade associations representing the advertising industry.17Legend symbol denoting See European Commission (2019c and 2019d). Launched as part of the action plan against disinformation and ahead of the 2019 European Parliament elections, the Code sets out a list of commitments for signatories to fight disinformation. Among others, these include closing fake accounts, improving transparency in political advertising and providing users with accessible tools for fact-checking and reporting disinformation. Since then, the signatories have submitted progress reports on their actions undertaken to tackle disinformation. For example, Google has elevated fact-checked articles in Google news and search. In March and April 2019, Facebook also reported that in each month it took action against over 600 000 advertisements in EU for spreading low-quality or misleading content.
- While spreading disinformation by traditional news outlets may be less of a concern in Hong Kong, self-regulation efforts in some places have gone beyond online platforms to focus on media organizations. For example, Sweden has a self-disciplinary system joined by major print and online news outlets in the country. Any individual can lodge a complaint with the Media Ombudsman concerning inaccurate news content published by member companies.18Legend symbol denoting This somewhat resembles the Hong Kong Press Council's mechanism for handling complaints (e.g. inaccurate reporting) against member companies, although the Council, a non-profit organization, has a smaller member base not including some popular print and online media organizations in Hong Kong. See 香港報業評議會(2017年) and 關鍵評論(2017年). The Ombudsman may then, upon investigation, refer the case to the Media Council for decision.19Legend symbol denoting The Media Council (Mediernas Etiknämnd in Swedish), founded in 1916, is considered the oldest of its kind in the world. It is composed of a panel of judges, media representatives and members of the public. The Council, alongside the Media Ombudsman (formerly Press Ombudsman), forms the self-disciplinary system of the Swedish media. The system is financed by four major press associations and four broadcasting companies in Sweden. The Council may even impose financial costs on violators.20Legend symbol denoting Often called a fine, an administrative fee of up to SKr32,000 (HK$25,378) can be imposed on violators as a contribution to the funding of the Council. Violators also need to publish a statement of the Council's decision as restitution. See Reuters Institute (2012) and U.S. Library of Congress (2019). This self-disciplinary system is well-respected in Sweden and handles over 600 complaints annually21Legend symbol denoting See Media Ombudsman (Undated)., providing an alternative to court for individuals affected by disinformation.
Education and promotion of media literacy
- With studies showing positive correlation between media literacy and resilience to disinformation, there are views that Hong Kong should strengthen media literacy education at schools.22Legend symbol denoting See Policy Innovation and Co-ordination Office (2016). Finland is one of the few places with a dedicated department, known as the National Audiovisual Institute, overseeing media education.23Legend symbol denoting The department is a subordinate of the Ministry of Education and Culture. It is established with the goal of promoting media education and creating a safe media environment for school children. See European Commission (2019a). Media education in public schools starts from pre-primary level and is defined as a cross-curricular theme in the upper secondary curriculum. Teachers develop creative programmes to give students lessons in fact-checking and critical thinking. The government also supports local organizations, including one that organizes hackathons (i.e. events where people come together for computer projects) for innovative Finnish start-ups to develop media literacy toolkits for schools.24Legend symbol denoting See The Guardian (2020).
- Promotion of media literacy in Finland goes beyond schools to the community. Back in 2015, the Finnish President urged every citizen to take responsibility for the fight against disinformation. To better prepare the government for the challenges of coping with disinformation, Finland once invited overseas experts to advise officials on how to identify disinformation and develop strategies against it.25Legend symbol denoting See Yle (2015 and 2016). Although the effectiveness of media literacy initiatives may not be easy to quantify, Finland ranks consistently first out of 35 European countries in the Media Literacy Index, a gauge of resilience to disinformation.26Legend symbol denoting See Open Society Institute Sofia (2019).
Legislation against online disinformation
Singapore
- Similar to Hong Kong, Singapore has existing laws that can be applied to combat disinformation, although they are seen as less targeted.27Legend symbol denoting Some examples include the Telecommunications Act, the Protection from Harassment Act and the Sedition Act. See MediaWrites (2018). The Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, on the other hand, is a dedicated online disinformation law. Effective from October 2019, the Act applies to individual persons and online platforms (including private messaging apps such as WhatsApp) that share false information, and whose communication is likely to have certain impacts such as prejudicing Singapore's security, public health or public interest. While ordering corrections is the primary response to harmful online falsehood, the authorities have the power to remove falsehoods that cause serious harm and disable fake accounts.28Legend symbol denoting The Act defines falsehood as a statement of fact that is false, and it excludes opinion, criticism and satire. For harmful online falsehood, the competent authority may issue an order requiring corrections to be put up alongside falsehoods to enable readers to see all sides and judge on their own. See Singapore Statutes Online (2019) and Ministry of Law (2019). An individual found guilty of knowingly sharing falsehood in Singapore faces a fine of up to S$50,000 (HK$280,000) or a jail term of five years or both. The fine goes up to S$100,000 (HK$560,000) and the jail term to 10 years if the falsehood is shared using a fake account or a bot.
- While there are concerns that the relatively broad discretion afforded to the authorities to remove content, coupled with hefty penalties, might limit online expression29Legend symbol denoting See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2019)., Singapore has reiterated that the law does not target opinions but online falsehoods. The government also stated that the courts have judicial oversight of the exercise of power by the authorities through the appeal process. As the Act covers encrypted private messaging apps, there also remain challenges in enforcement and identifying actual perpetrators of disinformation. Previously, a Singapore government official has made clear that the country would not force these apps to "identify who said what to whom", but it would only require corrections to be sent to app users.30Legend symbol denoting The Singapore's Ambassador to the United States clarified the issue in an Op-Ed article. See New York Times (2019). Since coming in force, the Act has reportedly been invoked 22 times as at May 2020.31Legend symbol denoting See Voice of America (2020).
France
- In France, while there are existing laws to curb disinformation32Legend symbol denoting France can rely on the existing Law on Freedom of the Press to stop the dissemination of fake news; and there is also a provision under the Electoral Code prohibiting the spread of fake news that could affect an election. See Poynter (2019), U.S. Library of Congress (2019), and Official website of France government (2018)., the Law Against the Manipulation of Information introduced in 2018 specifically targets large-scale online platforms. Different from Singapore's, the new French law excludes messaging apps and focuses on election disinformation, especially during the three months preceding general elections. Among others, it requires online platforms to disclose the source and funding for sponsored content (e.g. campaign advertisements). During the election period, judges have the power to decide, within 48 hours, whether to order removal of widely spread online content deemed to be false.
- The maximum sanction for failing to comply with the new law is a fine of €75,000 (HK$651,000) and one year in prison. Despite the lighter prison sentences than that in Singapore, the new French law has prompted some to err on the side of caution and block more content than is necessary. For example, Twitter has reportedly even declined to run a government advertisement promoting voter registration due to worries about breaching the law against disinformation.33Legend symbol denoting See The Independent (2019). There have also been concerns over the difficulty and risk for the judge to verify information and rule within the 48-hour timeframe.34Legend symbol denoting See Conseil Constitutionnel (2018). According to a report issued by the European Parliament, it is still unclear how effective this approach would be.35Legend symbol denoting See European Parliamentary Research Service (2019). It will likely take more time to see the effect.
Concluding remarks
- Disinformation is drawing growing global concern, owing to its impact on information flow and broad implications on public safety, security and other social issues. As such, more overseas places have scaled up efforts to curb the spread of disinformation. Places like France and Singapore have taken the lead by introducing dedicated disinformation laws, while other places have adopted a softer, non-regulatory approach. For example, the UK has established an in-house unit to improve its response to disinformation. Finland and Germany have enlisted private sector support in launching fact-checking initiatives. EU has counted on media self-regulation to balance between press freedom and oversight on disinformation, whereas Finland has promoted media literacy. All these examples may offer insights and lessons for Hong Kong in its quest for a more sustainable approach to tackling disinformation.
Prepared by Jennifer LO
Research Office
Information Services Division
Legislative Council Secretariat
16 July 2020
Endnotes:
References:
| Hong Kong
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| 1. | Bloomberg. (2019) How fake news and rumors are stoking division in Hong Kong.
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| 2. | GovHK. (2019a) Be cautious of fake news.
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| 3. | GovHK. (2019b) Defamation not tolerated.
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| 4. | GovHK. (2019c) LCQ4: Combat internet messages that are faked and prejudice public safety.
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| 5. | GovHK. (2019d) Police urge for rational dialogue.
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| 6. | GovHK. (2020) Clarifications.
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| 7. | Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute. (2019) Which of the following channels are your main source of news?
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| 8. | Legislative Council Secretariat. (2019a) Official Records of Proceedings of the Legislative Council. 11 December.
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| 9. | Legislative Council Secretariat. (2019b) Official Records of Proceedings of the Legislative Council. 18 December.
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| 10. | Minutes of Meeting of the Panel on Commerce and Industry of the Legislative Council. (2019) 19 November. LC Paper No. CB(1)330/19-20.
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| 11. | Policy Innovation and Co-ordination Office. (2016) Investigating Hong Kong students' critical news literacy in the age of social media.
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| 12. | South China Morning Post. (2020) Mythbusters: as Hong Kong coronavirus cases mount, so do social media falsehoods - the Post looks at a few doing the rounds.
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| 13. | 《不看你絕對後悔：假新聞背後的「真相」》，《關鍵評論》，2017年1月1日。
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| 14. | 《打擊假新聞須多管齊下》，《信報》，2019年5月27日。
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| 15. | 《立法打擊假新聞恐成言論審查》，《立場新聞》，2019年12月14日。
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| 16. | 《林鄭月娥：須認真研究如何監察網上假消息》，《香港電台》，2020年5月15日。
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| 17. | 香港報業評議會：《香港報業評議會主席報告（2015年）》，2017年。
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| European Union
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| 18. | Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik. (2019) European elections: Social networks cooperate with BSI.
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| 19. | CNN. (2019). Facebook will work with Germany to combat election interference, Sheryl Sandberg says.
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| 20. | Conseil Constitutionnel. (2018) Decision no. 2018-773 DC of 20 December 2018.
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| 21. | European Commission. (2019a) Finland: Media literacy and safe use of new media.
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| 22. | European Commission. (2019b) Tackling online disinformation.
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| 23. | European Commission. (2019c) Code of practice on disinformation.
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| 24. | European Commission. (2019d) Annual self-assessment reports of signatories to the Code of Practice on Disinformation 2019.
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| 25. | European Parliamentary Research Service. (2019) Automated tackling of disinformation.
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| 26. | Faktabaari. (Undated) Welcome to Faktabaari.
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| 27. | Official website of France government. (2018) Against information manipulation.
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| 28. | Sweden Media Ombudsman. (Undated) How self-regulation works.
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| 29. | The Guardian. (2020) How Finland starts its fight against fake news in primary schools.
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| 30. | The Independent. (2019) Twitter rules out French government over anti-fake news law.
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| 31. | Yle. (2015) President Niinistö on the Information War: We are all national defenders.
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| 32. | Yle. (2016) US experts gird Finnish officials for information war.
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| Singapore
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| 33. | MediaWrites. (2018) Singapore jumps on the fake news bandwagon.
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| 34. | Ministry of Law. (2019) Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill: Four key things about the bill.
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| 35. | New York Times. (2019) Singapore's bill on online falsehoods.
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| 36. | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2019) Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression.
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| 37. | Singapore Statutes Online. (2019) Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019.
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| 38. | Voice of America. (2020) Singapore's fake news and contempt laws a threat to media, journalists say.
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| The United Kingdom
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| 39. | Government Communication Service. (2018) Alex Aiken introduces the Rapid Response Unit.
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| 40. | Government Communication Service. (2019) Rapid Response Unit: A year in digital trends.
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| 41. | U.K. Parliament. (2019) Rapid Response Unit: Written question - 226754.
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| Others
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| 42. | Centre for International Governance Innovation and Ipsos. (2019) CIGI-Ipsos Global Survey: Internet Security and Trust.
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| 43. | Open Society Institute Sofia. (2019) Findings of the Media Literacy Index 2019.
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| 44. | Poynter. (2019) A guide to anti-misinformation actions around the world.
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| 45. | Reuters Institute. (2012) Regulating the press: A comparative study of international press councils.
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| 46. | U.S. Library of Congress. (2019) Initiatives to counter fake news.
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Essentials are compiled for Members and Committees of the Legislative Council. They are not legal or other professional advice and shall not be relied on as such. Essentials are subject to copyright owned by The Legislative Council Commission (The Commission). The Commission permits accurate reproduction of Essentials for non-commercial use in a manner not adversely affecting the Legislative Council. Please refer to the Disclaimer and Copyright Notice on the Legislative Council website at www.legco.gov.hk for details. The paper number of this issue of Essentials is ISE10/19-20.