Views of the Governance of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority

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Central Bank Independence

- Definition and Rationale
- Central Bank and the Markets
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- Central Bank Independence and Accountability

HKMA

- Monetary Stability
- Banking Stability
- Financial Infrastructure

HKMA – Advisory Committees

- EF Advisory Committee
 - Subcommittee on Currency Board
- Banking Advisory Committee
- DTC Advisory Committee

- EF Advisory Committee
- de facto management board
- Replace by the Board of Director

- Board of Directors
 - CE and Deputy CE of the HKMA
 - FS as ex-official
 - Independent members


Board of Directors

- Functions
 - Review HKMA's performance in relation to its objectives and strategies
 - Monitor the extent to which the objectives set in relation to HKMA's financial management have been met

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- Review the internal financial control of HKMA
- Determine the remuneration package of senior executives of HKMA

- Board of Directors
 - Two Sub-committees should be formed only by independent members on sensitive matters



- Audit Subcommittee
 - Internal financial controls
 - Financial management
 - Risk management
- Remuneration Subcommittee
 - Review HKMA's performance
 - Determine remuneration and pension of senior management

Cautions

- Independent members should be 'real' independent – creditability of the Board
- Independent members should be nominated by the Board and appointed by the CE
- Fixed term
- Transparent

Future Development

- 'Empire' building?
- Super-regulator?
 - Similar to the UK
- Future monetary policy?

The End

Thank You!