

立法會工務小組委員會

廣深港高速鐵路香港段

2016年1月19日會議

就討論廣深港高速鐵路香港段建造工程的跟進事項

引言

立法會工務小組委員會(下稱「委員會」)在2016年1月19日舉行會議，繼續討論廣深港高速鐵路香港段(下稱「高鐵」)建造工程的相關事宜。本文件旨在就議員提出的跟進事項，提供補充資料。

開場發言

2. 運輸及房屋局(下稱「運房局」)局長於2016年1月19日在立法會工務小組委員會上的開場發言的英文版載於附件。

暫停與終止工程所招致的費用

3. 根據香港鐵路有限公司(下稱「港鐵公司」)提供的資料，高鐵項目的650億元委託費用將於今年7月耗盡。如高鐵項目未能適時獲得立法會財務委員會批准額外撥款，根據政府與港鐵公司的委託協議，港鐵公司作為負責任的項目管理人，需要密切注視工程費用的支出情況，在某日發出暫停工程通知，以確保最後的工程費用總額不會超出政府的委託費用，即650億元。視乎工程進展，我們必須於今年2月底左右考慮是否作出暫停工程的決定。假如短期暫停、甚至終止高鐵工程合約，所招致額外的項目支出列於表一。

表一—短期暫停、甚至於停工 6 個月後終止高鐵工程合約招致額外的項目支出

支出項目	開支用途	估計所需費用
暫停工程費用	<p>工程暫停期間保留地盤必要的員工和機器，為尚未完成的工程安排定期保養及檢查等費用，包括：</p> <p>(a) 維持工地辦公室、工程人員和固定機械；</p> <p>(b) 繳付物料及設施儲存用地的相關費用；以及</p> <p>(c) 維持工地安全及保安，例如監察地下水情況和維持臨時交通改道等開支。</p>	每月 2.33 億元，如停工期為 6 個月，即為約 14 億元
終止工程合約費用	<p>(a) 支付承建商提出的申索；</p> <p>(b) 保護尚未完成的工程、隧道及工地，以及其保安工作，處理各項臨時交通管理計劃和監督地下水的情況，以策安全；以及</p> <p>(c) 終止員工聘用合約、取消工程分判合約、終止租用工地辦公室協議的賠償、終止租用工地上的機器所招致的撤走及賠償等費用。</p>	約 34 億元
合共		約 48 億元

4. 總的來說，港鐵公司評估暫停工程所涉及的費用約為每月 **2.33 億元**，由於港鐵公司與承建商簽訂的高鐵工程合約容許工程暫停最長 180 日（約為 6 個月），所以這項開支的最大總數約為 **14 億元**。如果高鐵項目最終不獲額外撥款，導致高鐵工程合約必須終止，將牽涉另外一筆約 **34 億元** 款額，用以支付工程終止的費用，包括支付過去申索的費用及保護工程的費用。這些額外費用的總額約為 **48 億元**。

5. 如未能在短期內獲得所需撥款而要終止工程合約，監察及核證顧問(下稱「監核顧問」)估計日後重新啟動工程直至完成工程的費用會高達 **282 億元**。即是說，最後完成整個高鐵項目前後共需約 **932 億元**(650 億元+282 億元)。

6. 若決定全面放棄高鐵項目，政府亦需要完成大部分餘下工程，以確保市民的安全，以及在交通上不會對市民造成長期的不便。這些主要工程包括西九龍總站大部份的土木及結構工程，包括大樓內挖掘工程、結構柱、地台和上蓋的建造，以及西九龍總站一帶的永久道路網絡，包括連翔道及柯士甸道的行車隧道和佐敦道一帶的道路網等。監核顧問估計所需費用將不少於 **106 億元**，另外，政府亦需要繼續保養這些工程，直至能確定新的用途為止。粗略估計，保養費每年需要 **1 億元**，當中涉及保護未完成的工程包括為工地加建圍網、維持工地安全及保安、監察地下水情況，以及維持臨時交通改道措施等。政府亦需要就這些款項另外向立法會申請撥款。

高鐵項目的成本效益

7. 正如運房局與路政署在去年12月提交予立法會鐵路事宜小組委員會的兩份補充資料文件(文件編號CB(4)394/15-16(01)及CB(4)333/15-16(02))及今年1月初向工務小組委員會提交的補充資料文件(文件編號PWSC82/15-16(01))中所闡述，我們根據於2009年11月提交鐵

路事宜小組委員會的文件編號CB(1)503/09-10(02)中採用的運輸模型，輸入2015年取得的更新數據(例如人口及生產總值增長率)，並考慮香港與內地的最新規劃資料和發展(包括道路及鐵路網絡數據、公共運輸數據及高鐵的假設車費等)去預測高鐵每日乘客量，再評估主要是乘客因乘搭高鐵所節省的時間而換算成價值的直接經濟效益。以50年營運期計算，因乘搭高鐵所節省的時間而換算的直接經濟效益折現估算約為900億元(以4%折現率至2015年的價格計算)，經濟內部回報率約為4%。經濟內部回報率是指在建造期及其後高鐵50年營運期內，項目的經濟效益減去投資在該項目的建築和營運成本的淨收益回報率。

8. 我們就2015年最新預測乘客量所採用的車費假設，與2009年預測時一樣，即高鐵的車費與現時前往深圳邊界的列車(即東鐵線到落馬洲)及直通車服務的車費相若，以保持高鐵的競爭力。有關車費假設列於表二。

表二－車費假設

目的地	高鐵假設車費 (港元)
深圳 (福田及深圳北)	53-57
東莞 (虎門)	153
廣州 (廣州南)	210

我們根據最新的預測乘客量和假設車費，推算高鐵項目的票務收益。至於營運成本方面，包括能源、維修保養、員工薪金、支援服務等，我們亦根據2009年預測所作的假設，並考慮通貨膨脹的因素，來估計高鐵項目的營運成本，以評估項目的淨收益回報率。

9. 必須注意的是，單純以上述得出的經濟內部回報率評估高鐵帶來的效益，屬於粗略和保守的估算，並未有計及其他重大但難以簡單量化的間接經濟及社會效益，例如促進兩地業務往來、創造就業機會、減少依賴公路運輸而減輕污染物排放等。

運輸及房屋局

路政署

二零一六年一月

(Translation)

**Meeting of the Public Works Subcommittee of
the Legislative Council on 19 January 2016**

**Hong Kong Section of the
Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link**

Opening remarks by the Secretary for Transport and Housing

Chairman,

Thank you for allowing me to say a few words first.

2. At the meetings on 23 December last year and 13 January last week, there were Members requesting the Government to explain again the outcome and costs which would be incurred if no additional funding was approved for the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (“XRL”) project by the Finance Committee (“FC”) of the Legislative Council (“LegCo”) before a certain deadline. Let me explain the matter briefly.

3. As pointed out in the paper (Paper No. CB(4)280/15-16(02)) and supplementary information paper (Paper No. CB(4)333/15-16(02)) submitted by the Transport and Housing Bureau to the LegCo Subcommittee on Matters relating to Railways, as well as in the papers (Paper Nos. PWSC(2015-16)50 and PWSC(2015-16)51) submitted to the Public Works Subcommittee in November and December 2015, suspending or even terminating the XRL works contracts would incur various additional expenditure items.

4. According to the information provided by the MTR Corporation Limited (“MTRCL”), the Entrustment Cost of \$65 billion for the XRL project will be used up in July 2016. However, this does not mean that we can wait till July to secure the approval for the additional funding. This is because suspending or terminating the XRL works contracts will also incur additional expenditure items. So long as we have not obtained approval for the additional funding from the FC, the MTRCL, as a responsible project manager, has to issue suspension notice on a certain day in order to keep the final total cost (including suspension and even termination costs) within the amount of Entrustment Cost provided by the Government, i.e. \$65 billion.

5. The Government and the MTRCL are closely monitoring the situation of the project expenditure. Depending on progress, we may need to consider by around the end of February 2016 whether the project should be suspended. The MTRCL assessed that the suspension cost would be about \$0.233 billion per month. Under this scenario, part of the funding originally allocated for the construction of the XRL will be used to cover the suspension-related expenditure.

6. The XRL works contracts between the MTRCL and the contractors allow for a suspension period of a maximum of 180 days (about six months). If the works contracts are subsequently terminated because the additional funding is not approved within the remaining term of the LegCo, another lump-sum cost of about \$3.4 billion will be involved for the termination, including costs for settling previous claims and protecting the works. The Monitoring and Verification (“M&V”) Consultant engaged by the Highways Department is of the view that MTRCL’s estimation is conservative. Should the works be suspended or terminated, the contractors may well take a different view from that of the MTRCL regarding their entitlements for the cost of works completed. This may lead to a lot of disputes and consequently an even higher additional cost.

7. In any case, suspending and terminating the XRL project eventually will incur an additional cost of at least \$4.8 billion in total, i.e. \$0.233 billion per month times 6 months (which is around \$1.4 billion) plus \$3.4 billion. Such an amount of not less than \$4.8 billion will have to be settled within the existing Entrustment Cost of \$65 billion.

8. Upon termination of the contracts, the Government will have to wait until the start of the term of the newly elected LegCo to apply for the additional funding. By then, both the time and costs required to complete the project will change. First, it may take two to three years to complete the retendering exercise and arrange new contractors to finish the remaining works. During the interim, we still have to provide minimum protection to the unfinished works.

9. Besides, the labour and material costs may rise by that time. Moreover, due to increase in difficulty and risk for the new contractors to work on the unfinished works, the returned tender price may likely be much higher. Together with the additional costs for design review, project management, insurance and maintenance of the existing works during the waiting period, the M&V Consultant estimates that the resumption cost until completion of the project will be as high as

\$28.2 billion. In other words, the total cost for completing the whole XRL project will amount to around \$93.2 billion and the time of completion will be further delayed. This will bring an enormous cost to our society.

10. The Government will definitely not suggest giving up the XRL project and leaving it “unfinished”. This is because to do so will mean that all the designs and unfinished works of the project will become abortive. Under such circumstances, not only will the Entrustment Cost of \$65 billion be wasted, but the Government will also need to undertake the necessary remedial works to ensure safety and to rationalise the road traffic arrangements. Examples of such works include most of the civil and structural works at the West Kowloon Terminus (“WKT”) (including the excavation works and construction of structural columns, slabs and the rooftop) and the permanent road network around WKT. The M&V Consultant estimates that the cost for completing these essential works will be no less than \$10.6 billion. Together with the Entrustment Cost of \$65 billion wasted, the total cost will be at least about \$75.6 billion. This amount has not included the cost for maintaining these works until there is a new plan for their use. A rough estimate of such maintenance cost is \$0.1 billion per year.

11. The additional costs incurred will still require funding approval by the LegCo. Therefore, the actual situation we are facing is that it is not just a question of letting the \$65 billion go into waste and “quit”. If we leave the project unfinished, then in addition to the loss incurred by the project cost, the expected benefits from adjoining developments, as well as benefits which XRL can bring to Hong Kong’s external connectivity, economy and the community as a whole will also be lost.

12. Chairman, we understand the community is concerned with the cost overrun and delay of the XRL project. The Government reserves its right under law and contract to pursue the culpability of the MTRCL as the project manager. We should not turn a blind eye to the consequences and suspend and terminate the project or even leave it unfinished just because we are not satisfied with the cost overrun and the performance of the MTRCL (or even the Government).

13. The Government’s aim is to implement the co-location of customs, immigration and quarantine (“CIQ”) facilities (“co-location arrangement”) upon the commissioning of the XRL. Compared with the separate-location model, the co-location arrangement can greatly facilitate CIQ clearance and increase patronage, thereby realising the full

potential of the XRL. Some Members are concerned about whether the co-location arrangement is achievable for the XRL. The Government has reiterated on a number of occasions that the implementation of the co-location arrangement will be in full compliance with the Basic Law and the “one country, two systems” principle. There will not be any distortion of the Basic Law, nor will the rule of law be prejudiced. We will not compromise the “one country, two systems” principle in exchange for economic benefits. The Government is still discussing possible options with the Mainland authorities. In any case, the specific implementation details of the co-location arrangement will require community consensus, so there is no need to make groundless conjectures for the time being.

14. The Government urges Members to consider the co-location arrangement and the application for additional funding for the XRL separately, so that the project will not have to be suspended or left unfinished.

15. Thank you, Chairman.