立法会
立法会CB(1)1106/98-99号文件
(此份会议纪要业经主席审阅)
档 号： CB1/PL/FA/1
财经事务委员会特别会议纪要
| 日 期 ： | 1998年11月14日(星期六)
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| 时 间 ： | 上午9时
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| 地 点 ： | 立法会会议厅
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出席委员 ：
刘汉铨议员(主席)
李家祥议员(副主席)
丁午寿议员
朱幼麟议员
何秀兰议员
何俊仁议员
吴亮星议员
吴霭仪议员
夏佳理议员
涂谨申议员
张永森议员
许长青议员
单仲偕议员
曾钰成议员
其他出席议员 ：
何锺泰议员
李永达议员
刘慧卿议员
缺席委员 ：
田北俊议员
李国宝议员
张文光议员
陈智思议员
黃宜弘议员
霍震霆议员
冯志坚议员
出席公职人员：
- 财经事务局首席助理局长(证券)
- 陈秉强先生
- 财经事务局首席助理局长(银行及金融)
- 邓咏菁女士
- 香港金融管理局货币政策处处长
- 赵洁仪女士
应邀出席者 ：
- 议程第I项
- 捍卫联汇研究小组
- 香港科技大学
财务学系教授
- 陈乃虎教授
- 香港大学
经济金融学院助理教授
- 陈永豪博士
- 香港科技大学
工商管理学院院长
财务学系教授
- 陈玉树教授
- 香港科技大学
工商管理学院副院长
财务学系系主任及教授
- 陈家强教授
- 香港科技大学
经济发展研究中心主任
经济学系副教授
- 雷鼎鸣博士
- 香港科技大学
经济学系系主任及教授
- 郑国汉教授
- 香港城市大学
经济及金融系副教授
- 关荫强博士
- 议程第II项
- 香港浸会大学
经济学系教授
- 曾澍基教授
- 议程第III项
- 香港大学
经济金融学院教授
- 饶余庆教授
- 议程第IV项
- 香港中文大学
经济学系系主任
- 宋恩荣教授
- 议程第V项
- 香港城市大学
商学院院长
金融学讲座教授
亚太金融市场研究中心主任
- 何炘基教授
- 议程第VI项
- 芝加哥大学
工商研究院教授
- 默顿‧米勒教授
列席秘书 ：
- 总主任(1)4
- 陈庆菱女士
列席职员 ：
- 助理秘书长1
- 吴文华女士
- 高级主任(1)1
- 司徒少华女士
- 捍卫联系汇率制度的机制
主席表示，事务委员会举行一连串特别会议，研究捍卫联系汇率制度的机制，这次是
其中的第二次会议。是次会议分 6节进行，事务委员会会与个别学者或由学者组成的
小组会晤，听取他们就此项议题发表意见。在每一节中，应邀出席者会首先扼要发表
意见，然后回答议员的提问。主席请议员参阅各位学者于会议举行前所提交的意见书。
I 捍卫联汇研究小组
(立法会CB(1)461/98-99(01)号文件)
2.捍卫联汇研究小组(下称"联汇小组")认为，香港金融管理局(下称"金管局")自1998年9
月推行的7项技术性措施是方向正确的措施，并已处理以往实施的货币发行局制度的
一些缺点，该等缺点被视为引致利率波动，因而使香港出现经济不景。此外，将外
汇基金债券及票据转为银行体系的结算余额，可使货币基础由20亿港元增至约 320
亿港元，此举可在不会导致高利率的情况下，消化较大额资金流出所造成的震荡。
金管局在9月15日作出承诺，表示兌換保证于未来6个月內有效。这项保证相当于为
期6个月的汇率保险或为期6个月的认沽期权，此亦即分别与联汇小组或默顿‧米勒
教授一直倡议的论点不谋而合。当局作出兌換保证的承诺将可恢复市场对港元的信
心。事实上，在 1998年9月15日至17日期间，银行体系的结算结余总额的净额增幅
为10 亿港元，此点足以证明在推行这项额外措施后，市场的信心得以恢复。
3.为解决金管局的措施的不足之处，联汇小组建议重组本港的货币发行局制度，并将
现时银行体系中的信贷供应与货币基础连系起来。市场利率应由经济体系中的信贷供
求决定。此外，该小组建议当局按外汇储备的各项功能，公开及全面地分配外汇储备。
4.至于维持联系汇率制度是否适当的做法，联汇小组强调，由于港元与美元脫钩或会
即时导致港元出现信心危机，因此为了本港的经济体系著想，目前绝对有必要维持联
系汇率。然而，当局需要制订其他策略，以应付一旦出现重大的危机。如果港元的货
币体系完全崩溃，当局最后可采取美元化的方案。因此，当局应就此方案的可行性及
实施时的技术上问题，进行更多研究。
5.李家祥议员关注按各项功能分配外汇储备的建议，或不能有效抵御对港元的严重狙
击。陈家强教授在回应时指出，在本港传统的货币发行局制度下，外汇储备在捍卫港
元和打击炒卖港元活动方面所担当的重要角色，未能有效发挥，因为资金流出并不是
透过外汇储备相应下降而得以抵销，而是透过调高利率来吸引资金流入。根据联汇小
组的建议，当局可订定清晰的规则，规定按以下各项功能分配庞大的外汇储备，例如
以外汇储备用作支持流通的纸币和硬币、支持货币基础、作为不时之需及用以纾缓资
金流出的影响，以便市场人士可获得正确的信息，对各种情况作出适当的反应，同时
，这亦有助不会因少量资金流出而出现不必要的恐慌。此举可充分发挥以外汇储备来
捍卫港元的作用。
6.何俊仁议员关注私营机构发行的债券不获贴现窗接纳，此项限制会对本港债务市场
的发展造成负面影响。陈家强教授表示，有需要规定贴现窗只可接纳外汇基金债券及
票据，因为该等基金债券／票据由外汇储备提供十足支持。金管局应只在有资金流入
的情况下，才发行新的外汇基金债券／票据。
7.陈乃虎教授被问及金管局在推行新措施时，应否保留若干权力，他认为，金管局应
尽可能避免行使酌情权，以免此举会有损该等措施的成效。例如，酌情厘定基本利率
会对外汇基金债券及票据与结算结余总额两者之间的转換构成障碍，此举亦有违兌換
保证的目标。
8.刘慧卿议员询问，在重组货币发行局制度后，金管局几乎沒有可行使的酌情权，届
时金管局应否维持其现有的人手架构。陈乃虎教授回应时表示，联汇小组沒有研究金
管局的架构及职员数目；金管局除履行货币发行局的职能外，亦负责制订其他货币政
策及监管银行业。
9. 陈玉树教授评论政府于8月在证券市场采取的行动时表示，虽然面对著严峻的市况
，有关的入市行动是无可避免，但当局过于仓卒决定入市干预，沒有全面评估此举对
本港和国际金融市场的影响。关于如何处理在行动中购入的股票，联汇小组建议，政
府应尽快有秩序地出售该等股票。由于政府兼具市场的规则制订者及参与者的双重身
份，因此会出现利益冲突的情况，如果政府早日将股票出售，便可早日避免出现此情
况。
10. 关于提高本港竞爭力的措施，联汇小组认为，在港元沒有贬值的情况下，本港必
须透过将本地物价及生产成本作出市场调整，以恢复竞爭力。该小组建议透过先进的
技术以提高本地的生产力。此外，政府应继续提高香港作为国际金融中心的地位、推
行合适的财政政策以配合联系汇率制度及在目前经济不景的情况下刺激经济增长，这
些都是十分重要。
11. 联汇小组赞同夏佳理议员的意见，认为如果金管局及早制订巩固货币发行局制度
的措施，并采取积极的做法，向公众人士灌输各项有关事宜的知识，金融市场最近出
现的一些问题本应可避免发生。联汇小组强调，加强公众人士认识本港的货币发行局
制度及金管局新推出的技术性措施，是十分重要。披露更多关于货币的资料和加强有
关的教育工作，均会有助增强公众人士的信心及稳定市况。
II 曾澍基教授
(立法会CB(1)461/98-99(02)号文件)
12.曾澍基教授表示支持金管局的7项措施，以及政府当局30项加强证券及期货市场秩
序和透明度的措施。他认为，金管局推行兌換保证和贴现窗这两大举动，基本上与他
所建议的AEL(阿根廷、爱沙尼亚、立陶苑)模式的原则是一致，但政府于1998年4月发
表的《金融市场检讨报告》中否决了该项建议。如果当局及早制订该7项措施，应可
加强本港抵御炒卖港元活动和操控市场活动的能力，当局可能无需采取入市干预这具
爭议性的行动。
13.关于更改兌換保证的汇率及厘定贴现窗的基本利率等尚待商定的事项，曾教授建议
当局在500个日历天內，逐渐将汇率由7.75改为7.80，并以美国联邦基金目标利率作为
基准，再加上一个溢价以反映港元的风险。该溢价可透过参考本港银行同业拆息率而
作出调整。他亦建议提供双向的兌換保证，容许银行按固定汇率把港元兌換为美元或
把美元兌換为港元。双向的兌換保证会增加汇率套戥的透明度，以便维持汇率稳定，
藉此减低因拋空港元而导致利率飙升。由于拋空港元不一定会导致利率飙升，因此金
融市场出现双边操控的危险亦会减低。
14.至于长远而言，本港维持联系汇率制度是否适当，曾教授认为，虽然有须要进一步
讨论固定汇率或非固定汇率制度的利弊，但现时并不是废除与美元挂钩的安排的适当
时候。然而，在外围经济环境可能继续恶化的情况下，或会日益令人怀疑7.80这个固
定汇率是否适当。长远而言，如果港元在下一世纪面临升值的压力，届时当局或会考
虑这问题。
15.关于当局处理在8月入市行动中所购入股票的方法，曾教授不同意外汇基金投资有
限公司由于持有该等股票或会被视为对市场具有影响力，因而应尽快出售该等股票。
虽然外汇基金投资有限公司最终应出售所有股票，但该公司应有秩序和谨慎地出售股
票，以避免对市场造成下调压力。
16.曾教授赞同丁午寿议员的意见，认为低而稳定的利率对本港经济复苏至为重要。他
并表示，自市况回稳后，名义利率自1998年9月持续下降。金管局的7项技术性措施会
有助减低利率波动，如果外围经济环境继续保持稳定，市场气氛会有利进一步减息。
事实上，本港的利率一直较美国联邦利率高3%至4%，但自从推行金管局的措施后，两
者之间的差距已缩窄至只有1%。
17.李家祥议员关注兌換保证会鼓励银行进行货币套戥，从而使银行体系因竞爭增加而
承受额外的风险，曾教授回应时解释，在推行该项新措施后，金管局可以利用银行业
的套戥者的助力，而不再需要单独面对整群投机者和缺乏信心的投资者。由于银行业
进行套戥活动，因此本港出现资金外逃时所引致的储备流失会由政府和银行业共同承
担，情况不再是为了减低资金进一步流出，当局在干预外汇市场时令美元储备直接流
失。他认为，本港的银行体系健全及稳健，有能力共同承担外汇储备下降的情况。此
外，贴现窗应可为银行提供充足的流动资金支持。
18.关于金管局承诺兌換保证为期6个月，曾教授认为，将该项保证解释为一项保险计
划或许不是适当的做法，因为当中并不涉及任何保费或赔偿金。他承认，政府官员就
维持汇率在7.80元是否适当进行任何公开讨论，将会影响市场气氛。然而，他身为学
者，希望指出在经济环境可能继续恶化的情况下，市场內出现的疑虑，并非关于官方
捍卫联系汇率制度的意向和能力，而是针对7.80这个汇率是否适当的问题。他补充，
本港必须推行建基于明确规则的货币发行局制度，以及提高有关运作的透明度，从而
加强市场信心，此举亦有助维持货币稳定。
III 饶余庆教授
(立法会CB(1)461/98-99(03)号文件)
19.饶余庆教授支持金管局为巩固货币发行局制度而实施的7项措施及为加强证券和期
货市场而实施的30项措施，亦支持政府于1998年8月的入市行动。他表示，自1998年
9月以来，股票市场转趋稳定、市民信心增强及资产价格回稳，这些足以证明政府当
局已成功捍卫港元及维持金融体系的稳定。不过，香港的经济基调依然疲弱。因此，
政府的工作是在不影响港元稳定的情况下，透过在财政、劳工、收入及房屋方面实施
适度的扩张性政策，刺激经济复苏及增长。
20.关于提高香港作为国际金融中心的竞爭力方面，饶教授强调，香港应改善本身的竞
爭力，此种做法将会较以行政手段禁止其他金融中心进行竞爭更有效。此外，香港亦
不能为着吸引更多金融业务，而降低对金融业进行审慎监管的标准和质素。他并建议
成立一个由金管局、证券及期货事务监察委员会、专业人士及业界团体、学者及专家
代表组成的特别委员会，研究如何增强香港作为国际金融中心的地位及声誉。
21.至于有关政府当局赋权行政长官直接向两间交易所及结算公司发出指示，以便当公
众利益受到威胁时，政府有能力尽快作出适当应变措施的建议，饶教授表示，该项建
议会被视为是政治性干预。他认为，如当局确有需要具有这种权力以应付危机，将权
力赋予财政司司长便已足够。他继而解释，政府有需要于8 月在证券及期货市场采取
行动，打击严重的"双重炒作"活动，否则有可能会触发一场体系性危机。当时的情况
的严竣程度属前所未见，政府必需采取紧急的特殊行动，但该等行动的目的，并不是
要将股票市场的价格维持在特定的水平。他引述海外学者支持有关行动的言论，并提
出美国当局亦曾作出类似的行动以防止可能出现的金融危机，而美国联邦储备局挽救
名为长期资本管理(Long Term Capital Management)的对沖基金便是一个例子。
22.关于基本利率的厘定，以及将汇率由7.75转回7.80方面，饶教授表示，金管局及外
汇基金咨询委员会已考虑学者提出的意见，并正拟定有关安排的细节，在适当时候便
会公布。至于发行新的外汇基金债券及票据，饶教授认为，新的外汇基金票据，必须
在资金流入的情况下才发行。
IV 宋恩荣教授
(立法会CB(1)461/98-99(04)号文件)
23.因为金融市场仍然出现波动，宋恩荣教授不同意在现时将港元与美元脫钩。此举会
破坏公众人士对港元的信心，令投机性冲击活动更加难以扺御。由于沒有出现货币贬
值，香港必须藉减低成本以恢复竞爭力。利率上升及通货收缩会成为调整过程的一部
分，而为了吸引资金流入，可能需要调高利率。
24.宋教授同意金管局的7项措施基本上已纠正了香港货币发行局制度的流弊，但他指
出，在固定汇率的制度下，港元仍然很容易受到投机性冲击。虽然香港是小型的开放
经济体系，但同时亦是国际金融中心，股票买卖的交投量庞大，因而往往吸引投机者
冲击其货币。他认为长远而言，美元化及效法新加坡的模式是稳定港元的可行方法。
事实上，金管局的7项措施已向美元化迈进一步。宋教授提及新加坡的模式，并解释
新加坡元除与一篮子货币挂钩外，亦有限制规定在进行离岸金融业务时，不得使用
借入的新加坡元。此举使投机者难以累积大量新加坡元进行沽空活动，从而令新加
坡元较能承受投机性狙击活动造成的影响。有关的限制是否适合香港，应该加以审
慎研究。另一方面，香港股票市场交投量激增，此情况自香港成为內地一个重要的
集资中心后尤甚，会令港元较容易受到狙击。更广泛地以美元进行股票买卖，或可
解决此问题。
25.宋教授在阐述其建议时解释，当局在促进本港债务市场的发展时，亦应考虑采取新
加坡的做法，使投机者较难进行沽空港元的活动。另一方面，为鼓励以美元买卖股票
，当局可挑选在国际股票市场交投活跃的股票，进行试验计划，作为一个开始。
26.关于金管局应否在货币发行局制度运作方面保留若干权力，宋教授认为，提高金管
局运作的透明度及披露有关资料，固然有助加强其问责性及投资者的信心，但维持金
管局的独立性亦十分重要。在此方面，金管局主动披露关于银行体系的结算结余总额
及外汇储备的总金额，以及关于厘定基本利率的机制的资料，均是可取的做法。
V 何炘基教授
(立法会CB(1)461/98-99(05)号文件)
27.何炘基教授发表的意见主要涉及本港金融服务业的规管机制，特别是有关机制是否
足够并充分准备可应付日后的挑战，包括激烈的竞爭、金融业务全球化及集团化，以
及金融工具的使用日趋普遍各方面。
28.何教授要求进行独立的调查，以检讨整个金融制度及其监管环境。刘慧卿议员询问
如何进行此项调查，何教授在答覆时以澳洲于1996年进行的调查为例，表示该项调查
以独立于有关监管机构的形式进行，由大约6名人士，包括业界及学术界的代表负责进
行。该项调查对整个金融制度进行了全面的检讨，所涵盖的范围包括检讨现行的规管
机制、研究日后的需要、邀请其他国际金融中心就可予改善的地方提供意见，以及就
有关的政策提出建议，藉此促进金融业的持续发展。何教授指出，特区政府过去就本
港金融制度进行的零散研究，以及于1998年年初进行的金融市场检讨的性质，主要是
就危机作出回应，并属政府內部所衍生的自我完善的行动，沒有远见可言。
29.何教授在比较本港与其他司法管辖区两者的金融规管制度时指出，世界的趋势是朝
着以功能为本的规管机制发展，但香港却仍然以机构的分类为主流。在香港的规管机
制下，一项简单的金融交易须受到多个不相关的机构所规管，导致规管方面出现更多
灰色地带。
30.察悉到本港金融业是由政府、证券及期货事务监察委员会及市场机构负责监管，何
俊仁议员询问在政府架构以外，另设一个规管机制的优劣。何教授在回应时表示，根
据英国的规管制度，监管权力集中于一个名为金融服务管理局(Financial Services
Authority)的政府机构。国际证券事务监察委员会组织于1998年年初发表的咨询文件指
出，该类型的机构能更有效地规管金融集团。然而，澳洲及加拿大两地所实行的规管
制度，监管权力较为分散，政府及市场金融机构两者均需履行规管的职能。另一方面
，何教授亦表示，即使设立了独立的规管机构，当局亦需在公帑中为规管机构拨备经
费，因为稳定的拨款来源对规管机构履行其职能至为重要，并可避免由于市场参与者
既是规管机构财政支援的来源，同时亦是规管机构所规管的对象而出现的利益冲突问
题。
VI 默顿．米勒教授
(注：这节讨论內容的逐字记录本见附件。)
VII 其他事项
31.主席提醒议员，事务委员会下次例会将于1998年12月7日上午10时45分举行，届时
会讨论监管股票按贷财务的建议，以及政府当局就市场参与者及学者对捍卫联系汇率
制度的机制所发表的意见而作出的回应。
32. 会议于下午12时45分结束。
立法会秘书处
1999年4月27日
Verbatim Transcription
LegCo Panel on Financial Affairs
Special meeting on
Saturday, 14 November 1998, at 9.00 am
in the Chamber of the Legislative Council Building
Mechanism for Defending the Linked Exchange Rate System
VI Professor Merton Miller
Hon Ambrose LAU (Chairman)
On behalf of the Panel, I would like to welcome Prof Merton Miller to attend our meeting. Prof Miller needs no introduction, everybody knows that he is a famous economist and is a Nobel Laureate in Economics. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate him on the occasion of receiving his ninth honorary doctorate from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
I am sure that everybody is very eager to hear his views, so I would like to call upon Prof Miller to give us his views, but leaving enough time for us to ask questions in the meantime.
Prof Merton Miller
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am proud and honoured to be here and especially to be considered an invited expert. We are kind of cynical of experts in the US. An expert has been defined as someone from out of town and that is certainly what I am.
To be sure to leave time, I am going to dispense with any formal remarks. People know where I stand, I think, on most of these issues. I would much rather react to your questions and try, if I can, to give my answers. So, we will start with Q & A.
刘汉铨议员(主席)
这样大家多了很多时间发问，请大家举手表示一下哪几位想问问题？只得一位吗？噢
，原来人人都想发问，或者先由李家祥议员发问。
李家祥议员
我很欢迎米勒教授来到香港，以前我也听过米勒教授很多讲话，让我学懂了很多新知
识。我想藉这个宝贵机会请教米勒教授，我相信米勒教授也会同意，经济理论和实践
未必一致，主要是因为经济参与者的行为未必全部都是理性的，他们对同一经济状况
可能会有不同的反应。我曾经听过很多位教授说过，投资者有时因为对未来的预测沒
有信心，可能会作出恐慌性的买卖决定，或者引致出现羊群心态。在政府8月入市时，
可能有人认为政府对自己的金融机制信心不足，所以作出入市的行动；官员又可以说
恐怕市民对机制认识不足，会出现恐慌性的行动，所以政府才入市。究竟事实如何，
我想是很难证明的。不过，米勒教授前日提议当局现应将行动逆转，即是政府在入市
后现在要离开市场。我想特别提问这方面的问题。
米勒教授在前日提议，应该一次过将政府手上超过千亿的股票以全球性公开拍卖的形
式出售。这做法会否令部分投资者担心或者预测股价会在很短时间內迅速下跌，这种
恐慌性拋售的危机会否存在？可否有其他方法，如分批出售，以便市场有更多时间消
化这些出售的股票，以避免一些风险？而最重要的，我很希望米勒教授可以指教一下
，现时股价上升大家当然开心，但如前述般出售股票时股价下跌的机会很大，差不多
是必然的现象，那时大家当然会不开心，对于这种情况，我们应该如何向市民解释这
项卖股票行动呢？
Prof Merton Miller
Let me say that there are really two kinds of markets, actually more. But the two main ones are what we call the continuous markets, where a bunch of dealers standing around doing bids and offers, like the New York Stock Exchange or the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and that is fine for dealing with small transactions of a few hundred shares at a time, and that is what it was designed to do. But there is another kind of market, where you are selling a large block, you want to sell a millions shares or a big chunk of shares, and you can't just go to the brokers, unload it and say "Get rid of it." There will be not only adverse market effects, but tremendous amount of uncertainty. When is the last shoe dropping?
So, what you do when you have a very large block to deal with is you have to use another kind of market mechanism. And that market mechanism is called the call market. The essence of it is that it is very open. You announce, "Hey, everybody, one month from today, a million of these shares are going on the auction block to the highest bidder." Actually, there are several technical ways to do that, but you announce it and everybody has a prospectus, and people from all over the world, not just Hong Kong but everywhere will say, "Gee, on December 20, there're going to be a big auction sale in Hong Kong. There're going to be bargains." Of course if everybody says there're going to be bargains, then you get a nice competitive price. The stocks will be sold essentially for what they are worth. This happens all the time. These big block sales are done. For example, the US government sells 15 billion of ten-year Notes, and it is done by an auction.
There is an interesting kind of auction called a single price auction, where everybody gets the same price. Or you can have what is called a discriminatory auction, where you just submit your bids. But in a single price auction, the one I want to recommend to you, you submit what amounts to a demand curve, ie "if the price is this, I will take so many, if it is this, I will take so many more" and so on down the list. The computer puts it all together, clears the market and everybody gets the same price. So, you can't say that this one has got an advantage over that one or anything like that. It is a fair and open system and will enable you to get out of the problem you've got there. You've got this big kitty and what are you going to do with it? It's hanging over the market. I don't say it's costless, I don't say it costs zero, but look, you've got into that mess and you have got to expect to incur some cost. You incurred some cost on the way up and now, unwinding, it is going to also incur cost, but at least you will get rid of it.
李家祥议员
我想跟进这个问题，如果分开几次拍卖，会否把风险减低？
Prof Merton Miller
By several batches, you mean first the banks and then the utilities or what have you, or you could do it any number of ways. I favour getting it over with as quickly as possible. I don't know, you might want to talk, as you should, with investment bankers and get their opinions, but I would be careful. Remember, they are not necessarily always objective advisors. I personally favour, as long as it is open, what is called the "sunshine trade", all the cards on the table, everybody in the whole world knows what you are auctioning. The market will adjust immediately at that point and people will pay the price of it.
Incidentally, I like this idea of follow up on a question because there is so much, first there is one question and then somebody goes on to the next. So, I think everybody should be allowed two or three go's at me!
刘汉铨议员(主席)
下一位是朱幼麟议员。
Hon David CHU
It is clear that you are advocating to get rid of these shares as soon as possible, but how about the opposite? Let's say if the government decides, for whatever reasons, to hold these shares for the longer term and also define a fairly long period, let's say, that the government will not release these share within the next ten years to give people sufficient assurance that this stock is not hanging over the market. Is there anything inherently wrong with this approach?
Prof Merton Miller
I don't deal in inherent rights and wrongs. All I'm saying is, I'm warning you, that nobody automatically believes what a government says anymore. And having done it the first time, people will say, "Well, they told us before that it would never happen, and it did." And now they'll say, "We'll never get rid of these shares." "Never? Maybe they mean it now, but things change over time and bang, down it will come." That's the problem with having that kitty there. If you don't have it, you can't be threatening to drop it on the market. It will have dropped all at once and it will be over with, and you can go on about your other business.
Hon David CHU
Just a short follow-up. The reason I am concerned about an auction of this amount immediately is that after the auction, the new holders of these shares may choose to release them at whatever rate they feel. And maybe at a rate too fast for the market to sustain at this volume, and may cause unnecessary turmoil in the market.
Prof Merton Miller
Well, if they release it too fast, why did they bid in the auction in the first place if they didn't want to hold them? Anyway, if they do sell on the market, that's their problem. I can't see that happening. Once you bid in the auction, it is presumably because you want to add these to your portfolio, and that is the way it should be.
刘汉铨议员(主席)
下一位是何秀兰议员。
何秀兰议员
谢谢主席。多谢米勒教授替我们对"专家"下了新的定义。在香港，"专家"有时可能是
相等于回避监察，不需向市民问责的挡箭牌。我们刚才前几节的讲者也提到香港若面
对某程度的危机，便需要考虑美元化。请问在 8月时本港是否已到了这个危机呢？如
果当时政府采取美元化的手法，是否比动用1,200亿港元入市更好呢？至于我为何不谈
你提出关于联汇保险票据的建议，对不起，因为我对这建议有所保留，由于该等票据
也是以港元为基础，当我们仍使用港元，而港元又受到冲击时，我们却采纳票据制度
，我看不到有甚么好的诱因，令市场接受票据。唯一有效的诱因就是高息，但高息却
损害经济。如果利息不高，又不能提供诱因，而且票据也有时限，譬如3年、5年，但
期限到了又如何呢？当然我们可以利用这几年期限来恢复元气，但这是否能帮助我们
重拾竞爭力呢？希望米勒教授能在这方面再为我们解释一下，好吗？
Prof Merton Miller
Let me say something about the "put" option, which everybody associates with me, although the HKUST people are also heavily involved. First, the point about the puts, that's one way of putting it as it were, I call them structured notes, some people call it puts, some people call it HKMA bills. It's the same thing. So, the proposals that have been made to expand the monetary base are very similar. I was amused to hear one of the previous speakers say that it is altogether different. It is not altogether different, it is a different form, but essentially what ever you are doing with those bills, provided you set the base rate at the US rate, it is essentially a put. Modern finance is so flexible that the same thing can take different forms. So, although you don't call it a "put" and although my good friend, Joseph Yam, would never call it a "put", nevertheless it is a put! It is the same thing.
About dollarisation, the point about the put was to calm down the public about the seriousness of maintaining the peg, and also in the process to remove or substantially reduce the temptations of speculators that you are always so worried about. If they know they cannot make a lot of money, then they are going to go elsewhere. So, that was the function of it and once you do it, you don't have to worry for a moment about dollarisation. People like Joseph will say to me, "Yes, but what if it doesn't work? What if despite all these puts, everything that we do and say, they still insist on attacking the currency?" Then I say, 'then you can, there is one last ace in the hole that you can fall back on, and that is dollarisation. Attack and attack all you want and you"re not going to wind up with anything, because we can always dollarise."
When Argentina played that card a couple of years ago, all of a sudden attacks on the Argentinean peso diminished. That's a powerful weapon, but you never have to use it, you hope. It's just like a club in the closet. If necessary, you warn these people, we can play it, but you hope you don't have to.
刘汉铨议员(主席)
下一位是何俊仁议员。
Hon Albert HO
Prof Chen, who is now sitting next to you, mentioned to us this morning that you gave a very comprehensive and succinct explanation to Joseph Yam about the relationship between the interest rate and linked exchange rate. I hope I can hear it directly from you. I hope we can understand it and, hopefully, Joseph Yam did.
Prof Merton Miller
I hope I can reconstruct the epiphany that I must have had. Essentially what we were trying to do in talking with Joseph, we had a long chat. Actually we get on very well, we have somewhat different educational and professional backgrounds, and sometimes it turns out when we are discussing, he's talking about one thing and I'm talking about something else, even though the words are sometimes essentially the same words. What I was trying to do, if I remember correctly, what Prof Chen is talking about is that you have to separate out two problems, two separate roles that the interest rate plays in adjusting and equilibrating the economy. And I said, to make life simple, let's suppose that we cut away from all the very complicated details of your actual plans, we are in a simple world in which you just have currency and coins as part of the currency board arrangement. What's the point of that? It's just to get rid of these distractions so that you can focus on it. Consider a world in which everything is done with currencies and now, the Hong Kong economy suffers a depression because after all, let's face it, all over Southeast Asia, East Asia generally, including Japan, the countries are in depression. But what happens in a depression? In a depression, a normal one, interest rates would fall. Why would they fall in Hong Kong? They fall because the opportunities to invest are not very attractive, and currency would start to flow out of the country and interest rates would fall. Now, let's do it the other way around. Suppose there's a boom. Now, everybody wants to invest in Hong Kong and sure enough, interest rates will rise to attract foreign capital in. These are benign equilibrating moves of the interest rate that would occur even in a simple world.
That is not the kind of thing that happened last August, or whenever it was, when you had the interest rates shoot up several hundred percent. That is not the way, we are not talking about the economic function of interest rates now. We are talking about a special defect in your original version of the currency board that made you very vulnerable to certain kinds of speculative attacks, that you can only deal with by sharply increasing the interest rates because of the liquidity crisis. When, for example, if you run out of foreign exchange or something like that, or if you are determined, for one reason or another, to defend not just the peg but the total reserves that you have, there's only one weapon that you have left, ie to have the Monetary Authority raise the interest rates, whereas the previous moves I was talking about of interest rate, nobody raised it, the market will adjust it. But that is not the problem that you've gotten into. You ran out of space in terms of your currency board, you had no option, or at least he thought he had no option, but to defend it by raising the interest rate very high. Once you do that, though, speculators or what you call speculators, not just George Soros, a lot of people in Hong Kong are also pretty smart, they can figure out, "Look, if Joseph is going to raise the interest rates very high, we have got a couple of plays that we can put against him. First, we can sell short in the forward exchange market, and induce him to say "C'mon attack us," and raise the price. I am willing to concede at least in theory, that this double play mechanism could work. As long as you can be sure that the only weapon you have is raising the interest rates, you"re giving them a free pass in these other markets, in the forward exchange market for itself, plus the futures market, plus the stock market.
So, Joseph may not be entirely paranoid, that may have been one of the elements in it, but the cause of it was not the speculators, it was the fact that they knew you were vulnerable and had only one weapon left, namely raising interest rates. That's where our "put" scheme came from. Look, there must be another alternative that you have, and that is to use the power of modern derivatives to say "We are not going to change, we are not going to shoot those interest rates up." How can we deal then with the speculative attacks? There are two answers to that. First, we can deal with it by letting the horde of exchange reserves that we have go down somewhat, but the other thing is that we don't have to worry about it. If the speculators, or the so-called, feel that they have nothing to gain, then they won't attack it because they are in business to make money. And if they don't think they can make money by this policy, they won't do it. Let me give a little analogy on that. We have in the US, I've looked around here and I notice you don't have it, it's called 'the club". It's a metal bar that you put over the wheel of you car to discourage thieves. Have they hit Hong Kong yet? To any serious thief, this is laughable, they know how to break those things easily. So, why are people selling it? Because they reason like a thief, ie thief sees the club on the wheel and says "Well, yeah, maybe I can get it, but it's easier to go to the next car." And that's the same way with these so-called speculators, once they realise that there are large amounts of reserve that the authority is willing to bring to bear against us, they will go on to the next one, they won't bother.
刘汉铨议员(主席)
下一位是单仲偕议员。
Hon SIN Chung-kai
The attack on the Hong Kong dollar was followed by the Asian financial crisis. There are some new suggestions that Asian currencies should become a single currency. There are also suggestions that this new Asian currency should be tied up with the Japanese yen, probably because the Japanese economy will have a great impact on Asian countries. How do you react to this kind of suggestions?
Prof Merton Miller
I think that is a very good point. I am surprised I sat through all this discussion earlier and nobody even mentioned the Japanese yen. That's a key element in all of this. When talking about the Asian financial crisis, I hope I'm not the only one, but I am certainly one of the ones who pointed out that much of that traces to the Japanese. They are getting away with a pass here, people aren't criticising "What happened to this?" Their economy went into the tank, their banks were suffering and one of the things the Ministry of Finance did to help pull their banks out, there are other things they should have done and could have done, but they said "Let's lower interest rates." And boy, did they lower it! But the point about lowering interest rates was to give a term structure play to the banks, so that the banks could borrow at short term or only have to pay very low interest rates and can invest in longer term securities. They thought, "Aha, that way the banks will make more profit and they can write off some of those loans"" I don't say it was totally implausible, it was, if you look at history.
So, down they drove short term interest rates in Japan, to levels we haven't seen since the 1930s. In fact, recently there was a period for a while when it was actually negative short term interest rates in Japan. It can happen! But in any event, that is what they did, and they didn't realise, or they didn't care or maybe they did, that when you drive down interest rates, you also drive down the value of the yen. That is a way of cutting the Japanese exchange rate " the yen. These countries in Southeast Asia were at least, some of them entirely, some of them are wholly linked to the Dollar. When the yen goes down, the Dollar goes up, and all of a sudden if the yen goes way down, and your exchange rate is linked to the Dollar, it's over valued relative to the yen which is the major economy in this area, and certainly a major competitor. I always warn people in Hong Kong, "Look, if the yen is going to drop to 160 to the Dollar or something like that, forget it." You"re going to be hurt hard and not only you but everybody else in Southeast Asia. No matter what you do, policies or forums like this, there are just too big shockwaves coming across your bow. Similarly, if it goes the other way, if the yen appreciates, you will be all right, you will make it out of the crisis one way or the other. So, you have got to realise that you are part of a bigger picture and not entirely a matter of being in charge of your own fate. Don't confuse yourselves with the US here. You are a small, but very interesting, country. But you can't, if the tidal wave is coming from Japan, don't kid yourself that there is anything you can do to stand up against it.
Hon SIN Chung-kai
I am not suggesting, but because the effect from the Japanese is the greatest, is it more logical that Hong Kong is linked to the Japanese yen rather than the Dollar?
Prof Merton Miller
For other Asian countries, the answer is yes. Some of them have de facto been doing that. They won't call it that but they move a little more inclined with that. So, I would say that the countries in Southeast Asia, many of them ought to adopt "currency board"- type programmes because why do they need a central bank and that kind of money supply for? Only, they should hook on to the yen. The reason is that way the Japanese can never exploit them with their "beggar-my-neighbour" policy, which is what the Japanese are doing. They are in a big drive, some of them, some people including some American economists, they want the Japanese yen to drop so that Japan can export its way out of its troubles. If Japan does that, though, they are just exporting their way into trouble in the other countries.
This is a problem with floating exchange rates that people don't often realise. They think of them one country at a time, but it's not. We have got a whole system of exchange rates and if the Japanese yen falls, it is going to affect all the other exchange rates accordingly. So, I would say some of them ought to hook to the yen, and that raises a question. What about China and Japan? China can't hook to the yen and the yen can't hook to the yen, it is the yen. Well, I suggested that the model China and Japan are to look to is Europe, the European Monetary Union, on the grounds that Europe was plagued with these competitive devaluations for decades. The French were quite convinced that the Italians, to use a slang phrase, were eating their lunch! The Italians were continually cutting the value of the lire and taking away business from the French. They believe that firmly and they may very well be right! Finally, and if you start with them on the subject and say, "What about the French versus this?" They"d say "What about the Greeks and so on?" There was a tremendous feeling of that we are all subject to this competitive devaluation, we can't take it anymore. Hence, the pressure to form the EMU.
There were political pressures too because of the natural antagonisms that have gone on for hundreds of years, and I don't say it will be easy to do it here in East Asia by any means. But I think at least it should be considered, that you get rid of all this competitive devaluation that is going on by having a single currency for the whole area.
刘汉铨议员(主席)
下一位是刘慧卿议员。
Hon Emily LAU
Thank you, Chairman, Prof Miller has been very critical of the government's intervention in the stock market in August and said that it has tarnished Hong Kong's free market image. But of course, events subsequently silenced some people because they looked at the fact that the stock market rose and we had made a profit, at least on paper, and they talked about the Federal Reserve bail-out of Long Term Capital Management, and said that there are all these problems in other countries as well.
I would like to ask Prof Miller whether he would agree with some people who said that the end justifies the means. Would you say that with hindsight, the government's intervention was not that far wrong, and the damage done to Hong Kong is really not that significant.
Prof Merton Miller
I would like to take that one up because this view which is so common is essentially a fallacy. And it is so ancient a fallacy that it even has a Latin name. We call it the "Post hoc, ergo propter hoc" fallacy, that because something happens at first and then something else happens, then there is a causal relation there. The classic example of that is every morning the rooster crows and every morning the sun comes up. What do we conclude? The rooster crowed and the sun came up, it's as simple an example of causation as you can find. Similarly, they intervened and about half the time, the market goes up and about half the time, the market goes down. Other things are happening all over the world and so it didn't turn out in this case that that was the bottom. But that doesn't affect the matter of principle here at all.
Hong Kong used to be known as a country with an economy where the market rules, you don't have the government intervening all over the way they used to do in Singapore and other countries. And that attracted foreign investment, people were willing to deal with Hong Kong as a financial centre. You don't have to worry about the government robbing you from time to time by arbitrary actions. Well, you've compromised that now. And that is why I'm recommending that you sell (the shares), that's a way of saying "OK, we won't do that again. We"re back to the old Hong Kong you all knew and loved." It's a signal. To say that "we intervened once and it worked fine" is just telling the market that you are going to do it again.
Hon Emily LAU
A short follow up. I would like to ask Prof Miller what is his assessment of the damage that has been done. You say foreign investors are very wary now, and you think we are going to have this problem because we are not going to be able to get rid of the shares in the short to medium term.
Prof Merton Miller
Yes, you are. That's what I've been trying to tell you! It's very easy, it's the easiest thing in the world. You have an auction and you get rid of it, we do it all the time in the US. I don't know why you can't do it here. Large block trades. That's easy. Don't kid yourself" that's another one of the problems with that policy. You've got this tie and now you can't seem to let go off it. You can if you are really serious in wanting to get rid of it, we can get rid of it for you. Nobody will be disadvantaged, nobody is going to pocket huge sums because of this. All the cards are on the table, there's a public auction and nobody gets any special benefits from that, everybody benefits.
Let me follow up myself on another thing. I am more and more sick and tired of hearing about Long Term Capital Management as a justification for what you did. It isn't. The two cases are entirely distinguishable. I'll use an analogy I got from Prof Chen, in one case the government was acting as a minor traffic cop, the reason of which I will explain in a minute, and in another case the referee was participating in the action. The story I always tell is about a fighter who's being pounded away and he says to his handler at the end of the round, "Boy, I'm suffering." And the handler says, "No, relax, he's not laying a glove on you." And the fellow says, "Well, keep an eye on the referee because somebody is sure beating the hell out of me." And that's the problem, when you have the referee get into the market, it's one thing. All the Federal Reserve did, in the first place, there was not a single dollar of taxpayer money involved, but you had (US)$15 billion that you gambled. OK, you flip the coin and the coin has a head and a tail and about half the time heads will come up and half the time tails. So, you flip the coin and you've got, no thanks of your own, but to developments elsewhere in the world, you've got a favourable outcome. But you did intervene. The Fed did not. Let's be careful about the LTCM, not only was there no money involved, but under US bankruptcy law, we have two kinds of things that can happen to a firm in bankruptcy. One is called "Chapter 11", in which you preserve the assets of the firm, and you get rid of the equity owners, of course. But you preserve the assets because you say "Look this firm is worth more alive than dead." The other is called "Chapter 7", which is liquidation, ie this firm is beyond saving no matter what you can do.
Chapter 11 is a way of saying the existing owners are out. So, in LTCM, everybody says 'the Fed bailed out LTCM." No they didn't. The people who were investors in LTCM lost all their money. Well, 90%, because in Chapter 11 you usually leave a little bit of equity to the original debtors because you want them to have an incentive to help you in the reorganisation. But a reorganisation that was definitely not the same kind of intervention that you had. What did the Fed do? It did even less than it did after the 1987 crash when Alan Greenspan got up and said, 'the Fed stands ready as it always does to prevent the markets from seizing up. We will provide whatever loans that are necessary to the banking and brokerage community." Now, they never said anything in this case. All they said was there is a portfolio here and everybody is trying to get a piece of it. It would be better if you did a reorganisation and went about it systematically. No more bail-out than that and I don't see that as a bail-out.
刘汉铨议员(主席)
下一位是李家祥议员。
李家祥议员
多谢主席。外来的专家肯定会带给我们更宏观的国际视野，我想就这方面的事项发问
。现时很多先进国家都意识到国际市场秩序的重要性，而需要更加了解这些对沖基金
的性质，有些国家的反应是在行动上作出一些规范，这样做是有违自由经济市场的原
则，我对这点是有保留的。但对这些对沖基金在不同地域的双边或多边操控活动，在
提高市场的透明度，让人清楚其活动方面，请问在原则上，米勒教授认为应否反对呢
？如果实行起来会有甚么困难呢？在与日圆挂钩方面，我也想作出跟进，我们与美元
挂钩，基本上是相信美国的透明度高，监管相对完善，政治上亦愿意负上国际责任，
但在日本方面，它的监管标准似乎与西方国家的很不相同，它甚至不肯撇除银行坏帐
，而且受政治的影响很深，同时它整个制度是倾向保护自己本地经济，根本不存在国
际责任的心态。如果他们是采取这种方式，而我们是根据这样的制度的话，是否与本
地的需要出现很大的差异呢？
Prof Merton Miller
There are two parts to that. First you mentioned hedge funds. They are very much in the news these days. What are the hedge funds? There are dozens of different kinds. A simple definition, if you want one, it is the way rich people invest their money. There is nothing special about them. I would say that if I had $20 million, I probably would have invested in LTCM too, because I know the people involved. I just don't have $20 million! But that is the point. There"re hundreds of different kinds of them. When you hear the call for regulation of hedge funds, you say "What are they talking about? If there are so many different kinds, who would regulate them? What is it?" It is just usually the regulators are very defensive about them. There was a big splash in the papers, it wasn't very well understood. But people will say to the regulators and Congress, "LTCM went belly up, where were you, what were you doing? You"re supposed to be a regulator." And they say, "Yes, I guess you"re right, we'll have to do something." But what it is, is by no means clear. There is no regulatory body that can take charge of this mass of 400 different kinds of organisations. Some are like mutual funds, some are not.
On the other hand, they'll say, "Look at all the leverage they have." Who gave them the leverage? Some of them the banks did. Why did they do it? The banks are among the most heavily regulated segments of society. That's defensive talk by the regulators. And, they will always react in crises, that's the way they do, and they may even make some changes. That, again, is the way regulators are, they will react to the last crisis. There is nothing in their mechanism that allows them to think of the next crisis because we don't know what that is going to be. So, they don't react to the crisis to come but to the one we just had. I also say that we are lucky that that is the case. Can you imagine what the rulebooks would be like if the regulators were reacting to crises that haven't happened yet, but that might, that they imagine might happen.
As for disclosure, let me make another point about LTCM. You must understand that disclosure sounds like a great word and in some contexts it makes sense, but if you've got a portfolio of debts long and short, I can tell you what will happen. You've heard about Warren Buffett who made an offer for the portfolio, but it was what we would call a low-ball offer. It was $250 million for a portfolio which is probably worth $3-4 billion. That is why he's the richest man in the world, he doesn't overbid for things. He made this up, the natural response of people involved is let's have some competition here. That is why I recommend the auction, get competitive. So, they called some other people and they say, "We've been offered $250 million, what will you offer for it?" They say, "Well, we've got to see what you've got in there." And so you show them what you have in there and they say, "We"re not interested." Of course, they go out the back door and they start selling short against you. So, by tipping off your hand as to what is in your portfolio, you just encourage the market to take the position against you. So, disclosure of these positions is not so obvious and automatic and is not a solution to any problem. If you say "you must disclose you positions", investors will move to regulatory areas where they don't have to disclose them.
Did I not mention whether Japan is responsible enough for people to tie their currency to. No. I think for the smaller countries in East Asia, yes. But it's not a question of responsibility, in fact, it is Japan's irresponsibility that leads to that. You don't want them to keep exploiting you with a falling yen. So, Malaysia, Indonesia, countries like that and above all, Korea, which is a competitor of Japan, may very well tie their currency to the yen. For Hong Kong, no, I don't think the urgency of that is at all clear.
刘汉铨议员(主席)
下一位是丁午寿议员。
Hon Kenneth TING
I think everybody is really worried that we are in the market, I am not commenting on whether we are right or wrong, but everybody is really concerned about getting rid of the shares. And some people are really concerned that if we go out, definitely, we are going to lose. But according to your analysis, by having an auction it can be good and, it can be bad, it is not absolute.
Prof Merton Miller
I am not urging you to speculate for profit in the market. In fact, I'm urging you not to do it, because if everybody understands that one of the players against us in the market is the Hong Kong government itself, which has a huge kitty and is standing ready to exploit us at any moment, they are just not going to go in. So, I am urging you to sell the stocks not to make a profit but to get out and to say to the public, "Look, hands free, we"re neutral in this."
Another thing you have to keep in mind, by having such a big ownership of a lot of individual stocks, they are not just faceless numbers, they are banks, property companies and so on, you are distorting the relative prices of those investments and I don't know if you want to do that.
Hon Kenneth TING
The only question is that everybody's fear is that once we get out, or the way we get out, we are definitely going to lose money.
Prof Merton Miller
Well, that's the fault of going in. You lost money on the way up, you"re going to lose money on the way down. That's an inevitable result of a bad policy. You happen to be lucky that at the moment events in the world have been such that, I hope you don't think that Hong Kong has done it" That's again my story of the rooster and the sun" Hong Kong has benefited from the general calming down of world markets, which buying the shares had really nothing much to do with it.
刘汉铨议员(主席)
下一位是吴霭仪议员。
Hon Margaret NG
Prof Miller, you haven't scaled the heights of our ambition. We are not trying to get rid of these shares. We thought it is jolly good that we are putting some of the exchange fund to much more cost effective use, we think that since we are facing a deficit budget, we might actually make use of this large block of shares to get us some money. Don't you think that this is a brilliant plan?
Prof Merton Miller
No, I clearly don't. If I have left the opposite impression, I've done something wrong. I think it's a mistake. In the first place, you must understand about investments, ie you get what you pay for. It's what we call a risk return trade-off. You can make more money at any time by taking more risks, but why are you taking risks? You've probably got too much in that foreign exchange portfolio anyway, and we are kind of advocating that you let it run down a little bit to take some of the pressure off your interest rate. But the idea that you would use your ability to buy stocks, to pick stocks to earn money for the government, I don't know" You have more confidence in the stock picker's abilities than I do. You will end up, one of these days, losing it all. It pretty much happens that way, I'm afraid.
刘汉铨议员(主席)
下一位是涂谨申议员。
涂谨申议员
我想问教授，似乎刚才教授所表达的意见是，你觉得美元化对香港来说其实是一个最
后的手段。我想问两个问题。第一，如果要实行美元化，即使把它当作是最后手段，
请问在实行时对香港有甚么"downside"，即坏处呢？第二，美元化会否未必是最后手
段，而是必须朝的方向呢？这里我有两个假设：第一是长远来说，中国与香港的经济
会更加紧密结合，香港会更依靠中国的经济增长；第二是我们十分依靠外来的资金，
如果一如刚才有些教授所说，假如将来香港的经济发展，例如因为在股票市场有更多
国企公司来港上市，令港元的数额更大时，港元可能受冲击的机会便更大。因此，这
最后的手段会否是必须朝的方向，或者是长远要考虑的方向，而不是被迫要采取的最
后手段呢？
Prof Merton Miller
Let me point out something that is often overlooked, about a currency board. A currency board is dollarisation of one kind. Let me give an example. I was just in Poland and when I was there I decided to talk about Russia because when you"re in a country you don't like to talk about its own problems but about somebody else's, which is usually even worse. I said, one of the Chicago newspapers heard that the ruble was collapsing in Russia and said, "How can people live when the currency is collapsing?" So they sent this team of reporters over there and found to their astonishment that life was going on as usual. There were crowds and queues in McDonalds, there were all sorts of activities going on. The answer is very simple, currency serves several functions; it's a unit of account, it's a medium of exchange and above all, to store value. What had happened in Russia was that the dollar was the store of value, if you are a Russian and you had some money, you quickly put it into dollars because you knew you weren't going to get robbed by inflation that way. Suppose you needed a cab fare or make local purchases, you might take a $20 bill and break it up into rubles. What we do in the US is you take a $20 bill and you break it up into four fives when you go shopping. So, they were breaking up the $20 into local rubles. So, they are effectively dollarising, but what is a currency board? It is a way, and why I recommend it for Russia, because it is a way you can recognise the dollarisation and still save face, ie there will still be a ruble because you hooked it to, and there's a ratio, as you know, of 7, 7.5 or 7.8 or whatever the ratio is, you hook the two currencies together so that although the dollar is the effective currency, it will look for reasons... the double eagle and so on" it will look for reasons of face as if there is such a thing as a ruble.
And the beauty of the currency board is that you don't give up too much of the 'seigniorage" because you"re earning interest on your reserves. In dollarisation you give it up, there may be some other advantages but basically, dollarisation gives up the 'seigniorage" whereas the currency board does not. What happens though is that if the attacks on the currency board get so strong that you"re losing all your reserves anyway, rather than going through this interest rate policy and push the whole economy into the tank, you say, "Look, forget it, you want dollarisation, we'll give you dollarisation." And that will stop it. Then you have the US interest rate because you have the US currency.
刘汉铨议员(主席)
最后一位提问的是何秀兰议员。
何秀兰议员
谢谢主席。其实这是我刚才第一个问题的跟进问题。米勒教授提到由金管局制定一个
"base rate"贴现窗的利率，譬如按照美国联邦储备局的利率，在中间加一个很少的百分
比，譬如是50点子，使两地的利率相差较少。但我有一点想提出，就是政府当然可以
在制定贴现窗的利率的过程中控制利率，把它降低，但香港有一个组织称为"银行公
会"，他们可以联手制定利率，因此，就算是由政府来制定一个低贴现率，又有沒有
方法可以阻止这个由银行联合组成的公会，利用市场信心崩溃的时机，扯高利息，
对香港经济造成损害呢？
Prof Merton Miller
You have got to separate these problems, if you've got a cartel arrangement on interest rates, you ought to break it, but it is quite apart from the attacks on your currency. I would recommend, and I always get stoned by the locals when I do this, is let the foreign banks in. Let them accept local deposits and let them do whatever they want. Then all this hullabaloo goes up and say, "We are not going to let foreigners into our market." Frankly, the US in some ways is just as bad as everybody is. But the more international banking you get in the area, the freer the system is in that respect, the less you have to worry about these interest rate cartels.
As for the base rate being the Fed rate plus a little bit, the point is the Fed rate is so that this conversion principle will work and the interest arbitrage can work, and that is what you want to happen. The idea that you use the Hong Kong rate as the base rate is just to defeat the whole point of it.
Hon Ambrose LAU (Chairman)
On behalf of the panel, I would like to thank Prof Miller for his precious time in giving us his valuable views, and his interesting parables. I understand that you will be going to the Mainland shortly and we wish you a pleasant trip.
